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ABSTRACT
The welfare benefits of financial markets depend in large part on how effectively households use
these markets. The study of household finance is challenging because household behavior is difficult
to measure accurately, and because households face constraints that are not captured by textbook
models, including fixed costs, uninsurable income risk, borrowing constraints, and contracts that are
non-neutral with respect to inflation. Evidence on participation, diversification, and the exercise of
mortgage refinancing options suggests that many households are reasonably effective investors, but
a minority make significant mistakes. This minority appears to be poorer and less well educated than
the majority of more successful investors. There is some evidence that households understand their
own limitations, and try to avoid financial strategies that require them to make decisions they do not
feel qualified to make. Some financial products involve a cross-subsidy from naive households to
sophisticated households, and this can inhibit the emergence of products that would promote
effective financial decision making by households.
John Y. Campbell
Department of Economics
Littauer Center 213
Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBER
john_campbell@harvard.eduA presidential address is a privileged opportunity to ask questions without answer-
ing them, and to suggest answers without proving them. I will use this opportunity
to explore a ﬁeld, household ﬁnance, that has attracted much recent interest but still
lacks deﬁnition and status within our profession. Teaching and research are still or-
ganized primarily around the traditional ﬁelds of asset pricing and corporate ﬁnance.
Economists in the former ﬁeld ask how asset prices are determined in capital markets
and how average asset returns reﬂect risk. Economists in the latter ﬁeld ask how
business enterprises use ﬁnancial instruments to further the interests of their owners,
and in particular to resolve agency problems.
Household ﬁnance, by analogy with corporate ﬁnance, asks how households use
ﬁnancial instruments to attain their objectives. Household ﬁnancial problems have
many special features that give the ﬁeld its character. Households must plan over
long but ﬁnite horizons; they have important nontraded assets, notably their human
capital; they hold illiquid assets, notably housing; they face constraints on their ability
to borrow; and they are subject to complex taxation. Household asset demands are of
course important in asset pricing too, but wealthy and risk-tolerant households have
a disproportionate impact on equilibrium asset returns whereas household ﬁnance is
more concerned with the behavior of typical households.
Research in ﬁnance, as in other parts of economics, can be positive or norma-
tive. Positive research describes what economic agents actually do, while normative
research prescribes what they should do. Economists have often hoped that ac-
tual and ideal behavior coincide, or can be made to coincide by the selection of an
appropriately rich model of agents’ beliefs and preferences. Revealed preference
theory (Samuelson 1938), for example, shows how one can work backwards from a
household’s choices over multiple consumption goods to the implied preferences of the
household. The revealed preference agenda leaves no room for normative economics
as distinct from positive economics.2
Household ﬁnance poses a particular challenge to this agenda, because many
households seek advice from ﬁnancial planners and other experts, and some house-
holds make decisions that are hard to reconcile with this advice or with any standard
model. One response to this is to maintain the hope that actual and ideal behavior
coincide, but to consider non-standard behavioral models of preferences incorporating
phenomena such as loss aversion and mental accounting. An alternative response
2My colleague Robert Barro summarized this view with characteristic sharpness when he told
me that normative economics is “what you do when your model fails to ﬁt the data”.
1is to abandon the agenda of revealed preference, and to consider the possibility that
households may not express their preferences optimally. On this view behavioral
ﬁnance theory describes the choices households currently make, but standard ﬁnance
theory describes the choices that maximize household welfare, and that households
c a nb ee d u c a t e dt om a k e .
In this address I will follow the second approach. I will compare what we know
about what households actually do–positive household ﬁnance–with our body of
knowledge about what households should do–normative household ﬁnance.T h e
comparison is not trivial to make, because positive household ﬁnance requires high-
quality data that are hard to obtain, while normative household ﬁnance requires
signiﬁcant extensions of textbook ﬁnancial theory. I will emphasize that for many
households, the discrepancies between observed and ideal behavior have relatively
minor consequences and can easily be rationalized by small frictions that are ignored
in standard ﬁnance theory. For a minority of households, however, particularly poorer
and less educated households, there are larger discrepancies with potentially serious
consequences. I call these investment mistakes, and argue that they are central to
the ﬁeld of household ﬁnance.
It should not be surprising that some households make investment mistakes, given
the complexity of their ﬁnancial planning problem and the often confusing ﬁnancial
products that are oﬀered to them. An important question is what determines the set
of ﬁnancial products available to households. This part of the ﬁeld might be called
equilibrium household ﬁnance. I suggest that retail ﬁnancial innovation is slowed
by the cost of advertising and educating households, together with the weakness of
patent protection for ﬁnancial products. In addition, I use my presidential privilege
to speculate that the existence of naive households permits an equilibrium of the
sort described by Gabaix and Laibson (2006), in which confusing ﬁnancial products
generate a cross-subsidy from naive to sophisticated households, and in which no
market participant has an incentive to eliminate this cross-subsidy.
If households make investment mistakes, it may be possible for ﬁnancial econo-
mists to oﬀer remedies that reduce the incidence and welfare costs of these mistakes.
As a ﬁnancial educator, I am tempted to call for an expansion of ﬁnancial education.
But academic ﬁnance may have more to oﬀer by inﬂuencing consumer regulation,
disclosure rules, and the provision of investment default options. Work on these top-
ics might be called household ﬁnancial engineering,a n di to ﬀers a powerful practical
rationale for the study of household ﬁnance.
2The organization of the paper is as follows. Section I summarizes the empirical
and theoretical challenges faced by researchers studying household ﬁnance. Section
II discusses household participation and asset allocation decisions, and section III
studies diversiﬁcation of risky asset holdings. One of the most important decisions
a household must make concerns the form of its mortgage. Academic research on
mortgages has often been conducted by specialists in real estate or asset pricing
economists interested in the valuation and hedging of mortgage-backed securities.
Instead, in section IV I treat mortgage decisions as an aspect of household ﬁnance
and use mortgages to illustrate the broad themes of the ﬁeld. Section V considers
barriers to innovation in retail ﬁnancial markets, and section VI concludes.
I. Two Challenges of Household Finance
A. Measurement
Positive household ﬁnance asks how households actually invest. This is a con-
ceptually straightforward question, but it is hard to answer because the necessary
data are hard to obtain. In the United States, households guard their ﬁnancial pri-
vacy jealously: in fact, it may be more unusual today for people to reveal intimate
details of their ﬁnancial aﬀairs than to reveal details of their intimate aﬀairs. In
addition, many households have complicated ﬁnances, with multiple accounts at dif-
ferent ﬁnancial institutions, having diﬀerent tax status, and including both mutual
funds and individual stocks and bonds. Even households that wish to cooperate with
researchers may have some diﬃculty answering detailed questions accurately.
The ideal dataset for positive household ﬁnance would have at least ﬁve charac-
teristics. First, it would cover a representative sample of the entire population. It
is particularly important to have good coverage by both age and wealth, since many
aspects of ﬁnancial behavior vary with these characteristics. Second, for each house-
hold the dataset would measure both total wealth and an exhaustive breakdown of
wealth into relevant categories. Third, these categories would be suﬃciently disag-
gregated to distinguish between asset classes, and ideally would go down to the level
of individual assets so that one could measure households’ diversiﬁcation within asset
classes. Fourth, these data would be reported with a high level of accuracy. Finally,
the dataset would follow households over time; that is, it would be a panel dataset
rather than a series of cross-sections.
3Most work on household portfolio choice has relied on surveys. The US survey
with the best data on ﬁnancial wealth is generally thought to be the Survey of Con-
sumer Finances (SCF).3 The SCF scores highly on the ﬁrst two criteria listed above.
It has good coverage and oversamples the wealthy, who have a disproportionate in-
ﬂuence on asset demands; and it covers all aspects of wealth including both liquid
and illiquid assets. However the SCF is less satisfactory in other respects. It is
only disaggregated enough to address questions of asset allocation; it does not report
holdings of individual assets and thus cannot be used to study diversiﬁcation. The
SCF, like any survey, relies on the willingness of households to participate and the
accuracy of answers they give when they do participate. Kennickell (1998) reports
that in 1995, about one-third of households chosen for the standard sample refused
to participate in the survey. The refusal rate was higher in the high-wealth sam-
ple: 56% for households in the lowest high-wealth stratum, and 87% for extremely
wealthy households in the highest stratum. Even households that do participate in
the survey may fail to report certain items. In 1995, for example, 64% of stockhold-
ing households reported a numerical value for their stockholdings, 21% stated that
their stockholdings fell within a range, and 15% did not report any value. Finally,
since 1989 the SCF has not followed households over time but has interviewed a fresh
sample of households every three years.4
There are several ways to improve and check the quality of survey data. The
problem of non-response can be mitigated by oﬀering households the opportunity to
state a range for asset holdings rather than giving a precise answer, possibly using
follow-up questions to narrow the initially chosen range. This approach has been
used with considerable success in the Health and Retirement Survey, which oﬀers
an attractive alternative to the SCF for measuring the behavior of older households
(Juster and Smith 1997, Juster, Smith, and Staﬀord 1999). In some cases it is pos-
sible to cross-check survey evidence against objective external data. For example,
the 1975 Wharton Survey of individual stockholders cross-checked self-reported share
ownership data against corporate records compiled by the New York Stock Exchange
(Blume and Friend 1978); the decennial Residential Finance Survey interviews res-
3Recent studies that use the SCF include Bergstresser and Poterba (2004), Bertaut and Starr-
McCluer (2002), Carroll (2002), Heaton and Lucas (2000), Poterba and Samwick (1997), Tracy and
Schneider (2001), and Tracy, Schneider and Chan (1999).
4Other surveys have similar problems. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) asks
questions on wealth every ﬁve years, but ﬁnancial assets are divided into only three broad categories
corresponding roughly to cash, bonds, and stocks (Mankiw and Zeldes 1991, Banks, Blundell, and
Smith 2005). The UBS/Gallup survey (Vissing-Jorgensen 2003, Graham, Harvey, and Huang 2005)
relies on telephone interviews, which limits the complexity of the questions that can be asked.
4idents of housing units and then contacts their mortgage lenders to verify the data
they provide on their mortgages.
Given the deﬁciencies of even the best survey data, there has recently been interest
in alternative data sources. One approach is to use the records of companies that act
as custodians for households, or that lend to households. Schlarbaum, Lewellen, and
Lease (1978) pioneered this approach with a study of approximately 3,000 retail bro-
kerage accounts held during the 1960’s; Odean (1998, 1999) studied 10,000 discount
brokerage accounts held during the 1990’s; and Barber and Odean (2000) expanded
the sample to 78,000 accounts at the same discount brokerage.5 These brokerage
records are highly accurate reports of holdings and trades in individual stocks, but
they sample customers of the brokerage house rather than the entire population and
do not necessarily represent total wealth even of these customers, who may also have
other accounts elsewhere. Similar diﬃculties aﬄict recent studies of asset allocation
in 401(k) accounts and other tax-favored retirement accounts.6
Some countries maintain centralized registers of shareownership. Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2000, 2001) use data from the Finnish Central Securities Depositary to
measure daily transactions in and holdings of Finnish equities by Finnish individuals
and institutions and foreign investors. These data provide a comprehensive picture of
Finnish household trading behavior in individual stocks, but do not reveal households’
indirect holdings through mutual funds, their holdings of foreign stocks, or their
allocations to other asset classes.
Government tax records are a tried- a n d - t r u es o u r c eo fa c c u r a t eﬁnancial data.
Blume and Friend (1975), for example, use dividend payments reported on income tax
returns, together with dividend-price ratios, to infer taxpayers’ holdings of individual
stocks. Unfortunately this method of inferring wealth from reported income gives
only a partial picture of household assets. The US tax system requires reporting
of wealth itself only in connection with the estate tax, which is levied only on the
holdings of the very rich at the date of death. Blume and Friend (1978) and Kopczuk
and Saez (2004) have used US estate tax records to study household asset allocation.
5Other recent papers using the large discount brokerage dataset include Barber and Odean (2001),
Zhu (2002), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2003), Ivkovic, Sialm, and Weisbenner (2004), and Goetzmann
and Kumar (2004). Feng and Seasholes (2004) analyze a similar dataset from China.
6Recent studies of such accounts include Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003), Ameriks and
Zeldes (2004), Benartzi and Thaler (2001), Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002, 2004), and
Madrian and Shea (2001).
5In Sweden, by contrast, households are liable to pay a wealth tax throughout
their lives, and this has led the Swedish government to construct detailed records
of households’ ﬁnancial assets. Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2006) use Swedish
government records to construct a panel of wealth and income data covering the
entire population of Sweden (almost 5 million households). The dataset provides
highly disaggregated information on the income, wealth, demographic composition,
education and location of all households. Individual ﬁnancial asset, mutual fund and
real estate portfolios are provided at the single property and security level. Each
individual can be followed over time. The income data begin in 1983 and the wealth
data in 1999. This dataset aﬀords the unique opportunity to analyze the ﬁnancial
behavior of the entire population of an industrialized country.7
B. Modelling
Normative household ﬁnance asks how households should invest. This is chal-
lenging because household decision problems involve many complications that are
neglected by standard textbooks. Perhaps most obviously, households must plan
their ﬁnancial strategies over a lifetime rather than over a single short period. The
seminal work of Merton (1971, 1973) introduced a conceptual framework for long-term
ﬁnancial planning when investment opportunities vary over time. Merton empha-
sized that long-term investors must consider not only risks to their wealth, but also
risks to the productivity of their wealth–the rate of return at which wealth can be
reinvested. This implies that long-term investors should hedge shocks to any state
variable that predicts expected returns, as well as shocks to wealth itself.
The Merton framework is much harder to work with than the traditional mean-
variance analysis of portfolio choice, and it was not until the 1990’s that empirically
usable versions of the Merton model were developed. One branch of the literature
concentrates on shocks to the real interest rate, assuming that all movements in invest-
ment opportunities are captured by this variable–that is, assuming that risk premia
are constant through time (Campbell and Viceira 2001, Wachter 2003). A second
branch of the literature concentrates on the equity premium, assuming that it follows
an exogenous time-series process such as an AR(1) (Kim and Omberg 1996, Camp-
7Massa and Simonov (2003) also study the portfolios of Swedish households by merging survey
data on income, wealth, and asset allocation with data on individual stock ownership of Swedish
companies from 1995 to 2000. Stock ownership data were available in this period since Swedish
companies were legally required to report the identity of most of their shareholders.
6bell and Viceira 1999). More recent work allows for general multivariate processes
to drive both interest rates and risk premia on multiple assets (Brennan, Schwartz,
and Lagnado 1997, Lynch 2001, Campbell and Viceira 2003).
An appealing feature of these models is that they can explain some obvious discrep-
ancies between the predictions of mean-variance analysis and the ﬁnancial planning
advice that is usually oﬀered to households. For example, Canner, Mankiw, and
Weil (1997) point out that ﬁnancial planners typically advise conservative investors
to hold more bonds relative to stocks in their risky portfolios, contrary to the mutual
fund theorem of Tobin (1958). This advice makes sense if bonds are hedges against
time-variation in interest rates.
An important theme in this work is the distinction between real and nominal
magnitudes. The risk properties of long-term nominal bonds, for example, depend
critically on the properties that one assumes for inﬂation. If inﬂation is well con-
trolled, then nominal bonds are safe assets for long-term investors, but inﬂation can
make them highly risky and poor proxies for inﬂation-indexed bonds. Because inﬂa-
tion shocks are persistent, the distinction between real and nominal bonds is much
more important than the distinction between real and nominal bills in short-horizon
models.
Models in the Merton tradition assume that all wealth is held in a liquid, easily
tradable form. But the largest component of wealth for most households is human
capital, which is nontradable. Households receive labor income but cannot sell claims
to that income. If labor income is perfectly correlated with traded assets, and if
households can short those assets, then households can hedge their labor income
risk and undo the eﬀects of labor income on their total portfolio (Bodie, Merton,
and Samuelson 1992). In practice, however, much of the risk in labor income is
idiosyncratic and therefore unhedgeable. This background risk increases eﬀective
risk aversion and leads households to invest more cautiously (Heaton and Lucas 2000,
Viceira 2001). Some households may be able to increase their labor supply in response
to poor investment returns, either by increasing hours worked or by delaying their
retirement; this added ﬂexibility increases households’ willingness to take ﬁnancial
risks (Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson 1992, Farhi and Panageas 2005).8
8A small recent literature builds on the human capital literature in labor economics, treating
education as a risky investment that is chosen jointly with risky ﬁnancial assets (Palacios-Huerta
2003, Saks and Shore 2005).
7There is a debate in the literature about the risk properties of labor income.
Some authors ﬁnd that labor income is similar to an implicit holding of safe assets,
stimulating investment in risky ﬁnancial assets (Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005);
others argue that labor income and capital income covary in the long run (Benzoni,
Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein 2005), or that the volatility of idiosyncratic labor
income risk covaries negatively with stock returns (Lynch and Tan 2004, Storeslet-
ten, Telmer, and Yaron 2004), in which case labor income crowds out stock market
investments.
Housing is an asset class of dominant importance for middle-class homeowners.
Houses are long-term assets that deliver a stream of housing services to their owners;
in this sense they are like long-term bonds and can be used to hedge changes in the
relative price of housing and non-housing consumption (Pelizzon and Weber 2005,
Sinai and Souleles 2005). But houses are also illiquid assets, so homeowners ﬁnd
it costly to adjust their consumption of housing services in response to economic
shocks. This illiquidity may discourage homeownership and ﬁnancial risktaking by
homeowners.9
Housing, unlike labor income, provides collateral that can be used to facilitate bor-
rowing. Another important aspect of household ﬁnance is the existence of borrowing
constraints.10 Households must consider the fact that their future consumption may
be determined not just by their wealth and by investment opportunities, but also by
their net future income if they are borrowing constrained. Financial investments
that do poorly when income is temporarily low may be unattractive for this reason.
Borrowing constraints are likely to be more important for young households than
for older households that have built up some retirement savings. Life-cycle aspects of
household ﬁnance also complicate the normative theory, because one cannot use sta-
tionary inﬁnite-horizon models but instead must use more complicated ﬁnite-horizon
models that capture the evolution of ﬁnancial strategy as households age and accu-
9See Cocco (2005), Flavin and Nakagawa (2004), Fratantoni (2001), Shore and Sinai (2005), and
Yao and Zhang (2005). Davidoﬀ (2006) ﬁnds that the covariance between labor income and house
prices aﬀects the size of a household’s position in owner-occupied housing.
10A variety of studies have found that consumption responds to predictable changes in income in
a manner that suggests the relevance of borrowing constraints for many households. Particularly
convincing are recent microeconomic studies of social security tax withholding (Parker 1999), income
tax refunds (Souleles 1999, Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 2004), and paycheck receipt (Stephens
2006).
8mulate ﬁnancial assets.11
Finally, household decisions must take account of the complexities and non-neutralities
of the tax code. Relevant complications include the taxation of nominal rather than
real interest, the availability of tax-favored retirement accounts, the tax deductibility
of mortgage interest, the taxation of capital gains only when these gains are realized
through asset sales, and the adjustment of the capital gains tax basis at death.12
A particularly important example that illustrates how these considerations can in-
teract with one another is the choice between an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) and
a ﬁxed-rate mortgage (FRM). An adjustable-rate mortgage is eﬀectively a ﬂoating-
rate note issued by a household, while a ﬁxed-rate mortgage is a long-term nominal
bond, typically with a call option that allows the household to repay its loan at face
value and reﬁnance the mortgage if interest rate movements make it desirable to do
so. In textbook ﬁnancial theory, a ﬂoating-rate note is a safer instrument than a
long-term nominal bond; it has a stable value that is almost unaﬀected by movements
in interest rates, while the value of a long-term bond is highly sensitive to interest
rates. Yet ﬁnancial planners typically describe ARMs as risky for households.13
This apparent paradox can be resolved by taking account of two special character-
istics of the household ﬁnancial problem. First, the household is planning over a long
horizon. If real interest rates vary, then an ARM exposes the household to the risk
that real borrowing costs will increase. The household may wish to hedge this risk,
as in the Merton framework, by using a long-term ﬁxed-rate mortgage. The ideal
instrument for this purpose would be an inﬂation-indexed mortgage, but if inﬂation
risk is modest a nominal FRM may be an adequate proxy.
Second, the household faces the risk that borrowing constraints may bind in future
11Gourinchas and Parker (2002) provide a workhorse model of saving over the life-cycle in the
presence of risky labor income. Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) extend the model to allow for
portfolio choice. Davis, Kubler, and Willen (2003) argue that the lowest and most realistic equity
demands result from borrowing that is expensive (costing the average rate of return on equity) rather
than impossible. The possibility of expensive borrowing reduces precautionary saving and thus
equity demand later in life.
12Poterba (2002) surveys the vast literature on taxation and optimal portfolio choice. Recent
contributions that emphasize life-cycle eﬀects include Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2001, 2004) and
Gomes, Michaelides and Polkovnichenko (2004).
13Fisher and Shelly (2002), for example, write “An ARM can pay oﬀ, but it’s a gamble. Sometimes
there’s a lot to be said for something that’s safe and dependable, like a ﬁxed-rate mortgage.” (p.
319)
9periods. If future income declines temporarily, the household may wish to borrow;
but it may be unable to do so if future house prices have fallen so that collateral is
unavailable. If future borrowing constraints are a concern, then ARMs are relatively
risky even when real interest rates are constant. To see this, consider what happens
when expected future inﬂation increases. The nominal interest rate, and hence
the required monthly payments on an ARM, increase even though the price level
has not yet increased. This accelerated repayment of the loan compensates the
lender for future inﬂation. It has no eﬀect on a household that can borrow to make
the accelerated payments required by the ARM, but it reduces consumption for a
borrowing-constrained household.
Campbell and Cocco (2003) solve a numerical model of household mortgage choice
and show that ARMs should be attractive to unconstrained households when inﬂa-
tion risk is large relative to real interest rate risk; they should be attractive to po-
tentially borrowing-constrained households with low risk aversion; but they should
be unattractive to risk-averse borrowing-constrained households, particularly those
that have high mortgage debt relative to their income. In this paper, Appendix A
presents a simple analytical model in which the same points can be understood.
A fundamental issue that confronts the normative literature is how to specify
the utility function of households. It is common to assume that households have
time-separable power utility or Epstein-Zin utility, so that their relative risk aversion
does not vary with their wealth. Asset pricing models with this feature capture the
stability of interest rates and asset valuation ratios in the face of long-run economic
growth. But some aspects of short-run asset price behavior and cross-sectional vari-
ation in risktaking suggest that relative risk aversion declines with wealth. Carroll
(2002) has proposed a model in which bequest utility has lower curvature than con-
sumption utility, so that risk aversion falls as households accumulate wealth over the
life cycle; and models of habit formation (Campbell and Cochrane 1999) or consump-
tion commitments (Chetty and Szeidl 2005) imply that risk aversion ﬂuctuates with
short-term movements in wealth. Ultimately it should be possible to assess these
alternative models by their consistency with the behavior of households that appear
to be more sophisticated, or with the advice of ﬁnancial planners (Canner, Mankiw,
and Weil 1997). Until some consensus is reached, normative household ﬁnance should
emphasize results that are robust to alternative speciﬁcations of household utility.
10II. Participation and Asset Allocation
How do households allocate their assets across broad categories such as money
market instruments, bonds, equities, and real estate? How many households par-
ticipate in these markets at all? Given that they have decided to participate, what
fraction of their assets do they allocate to each category? How does household be-
havior vary with age, wealth, and other household characteristics? These questions
can be answered without having detailed information on individual asset holdings, so
the data problems described in section I.A are not as serious in this context.
Following Bertaut and Haliassos (1995), Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002), and
Tracy, Schneider and Chan (1999), I now summarize the information in the 2001
Survey of Consumer Finances about these questions. Figure 1 presents the cross-
sectional wealth distribution. The horizontal axis in this ﬁgure shows the percentiles
of the distribution of total assets, deﬁned broadly to include both ﬁnancial assets and
nonﬁnancial assets (durable goods, real estate, and private business equity, but not
deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans or human capital). The vertical axis reports dollars
on a log scale. The three lines in the ﬁgure show the average levels of total assets,
ﬁnancial assets, and net worth (total assets less debts, including mortgages, home
equity loans, credit card debt, and other debt) at each percentile of the total assets
distribution. It is clear from the ﬁgure that many households have negligible ﬁnancial
assets. Even the median household has ﬁnancial assets of only $35,000, net worth of
$86,000, and total assets of $135,000.
The ﬁgure also shows the extreme skewness of the wealth distribution. Wealthy
households at the right of the ﬁgure have an overwhelming inﬂuence on aggregate
statistics; if these households behave diﬀerently from households in the middle of
the wealth distribution, then aggregates can tell us very little about the ﬁnancial
decisionmaking of a typical household. In asset pricing models, the behavior of
wealthy households is disproportionately important for asset price determination,
but household ﬁnance is more concerned with the behavior of typical households and
its implications for their welfare.
A. Wealth eﬀects
Figure 2 illustrates the participation decisions of households with diﬀerent levels
of wealth. The horizontal axis is the same as in Figure 1, but the vertical axis now
11shows the fraction of households that participate in particular asset classes. For this
ﬁgure I have aggregated the SCF asset data into several broad categories: safe assets,
vehicles, real estate, public equity, private business assets, and bonds.14
Given the negligible ﬁnancial assets held by households at the left of the ﬁgure, it
should not be surprising that these households often fail to participate in risky ﬁnan-
cial markets. Standard ﬁnancial theory predicts that households should take at least
some amount of any gamble with a positive expected return, but this result ignores
ﬁxed costs of participation, which can easily overwhelm the gain from participation
at low levels of wealth. Figure 2 shows that most households in the bottom quar-
tile of the wealth distribution hold only liquid assets and vehicles, with a minority
participating in real estate through homeownership.
As we move to the right in the ﬁgure we see an increasing fraction of households
participating in equity markets, but participation is far from universal even among
quite wealthy households. This ﬁnding has also been emphasized by Mankiw and
Zeldes (1991), Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), and Heaton and Lucas (2000). Limited
participation among the wealthy poses a signiﬁcant challenge to ﬁnancial theory and
is one of the main stylized facts of household ﬁnance. At the 80th percentile of the
wealth distribution, for example, a typical household has about $200,000 in ﬁnancial
assets, but almost 20% of these households own no public equity.
Many wealthy households have signiﬁcant private business assets. Gentry and
Hubbard (2004) report that private business owners hold as much as 40% of total
net worth even though they are less than 10% of the population, implying that these
households are particularly important for aggregate asset demands and hence for
asset pricing. Figure 2 shows that the fraction of business owners increases from
22% at the 80th percentile of the wealth distribution to 70% at the right tail of
the distribution. Heaton and Lucas (2000) have emphasized that private business
assets substitute for public equity in the portfolios of some wealthy households. The
fraction of households at the 80th percentile of the wealth distribution that hold
neither private business assets nor public equity is just under 10%. Thus private
business assets can explain much of the nonparticipation in public equity markets by
wealthy households, but there remains a signiﬁcant number of these households who
14Safe assets include checking, saving, money market, and call accounts, CD’s, and US savings
bonds. Public equity includes stocks and mutual funds held in taxable or retirement accounts or
trusts. Bonds include government bonds other than US savings bonds, municipal, corporate, foreign,
and mortgage-backed bonds, cash-value life insurance, and amounts in mutual funds, retirement
accounts, trusts, and other managed assets that are not invested in stock.
12have no exposure to equity risk of any kind.
Figure 3 illustrates the asset allocation decisions of households with diﬀerent levels
of wealth. The horizontal axis is the same as in the two previous ﬁgures, but the
vertical axis now shows the weight of an asset class in the aggregate portfolio of
households at each level of wealth (equivalently, the wealth-weighted mean share of
the asset class, which is almost identical to the unweighted mean share, for households
within a given wealth range). The ﬁgure shows the dominant role of liquid assets and
vehicles for the poor, and real estate–primarily owner-occupied housing–for middle-
class households. Mortgage debt is correspondingly important for these households.
E q u i t yh a ss o m ei m p o r t a n c ef o rt h em i d d l ec l a s s ,b u tt a k e st h el a r g e s tp o r t f o l i os h a r e
only for wealthier households at the right of the ﬁgure.15
Figure 3 shows that wealthy households are willing to take greater risk in their
portfolios. This is partly the result of greater participation in risky asset classes by
wealthy households, but also partly the result of higher portfolio shares conditional
on participation. Carroll (2002) emphasizes this phenomenon and shows that similar
patterns exist in several European countries.16
B. Demographic eﬀects
Wealth is not the only household characteristic that may predict its willingness to
take ﬁnancial risk. Income, age, race, education, and self-reported attitudes to risk
may also be important.
Before one can understand the relative importance of these eﬀects, one must
confront a fundamental identiﬁcation problem (Heckman and Robb 1985, Ameriks
and Zeldes 2004). At any time t ap e r s o nb o r ni ny e a rb is at years old, where
at = t − b. Thus it is inherently impossible to separately identify age eﬀects, time
15A similar ﬁgure, for the median portfolio share rather than the wealth-weighted mean portfolio
share, is shown in Tracy, Schneider, and Chan (1999). Joe Tracy calls it a “whale chart” because
t h er e a le s t a t el i n ed e ﬁnes the body of a whale, while the equity line traces out its tail. Kopczuk
and Saez (2004) use estate tax returns to look at the extreme right tail of the wealth distribution.
They ﬁnd that the real estate share continues to decline, while the equity share continues to increase,
within the top 0.5% of the population.
16King and Leape (1998) capture the same phenomenon in a diﬀerent way, by estimating wealth
elasticities of demand for diﬀerent asset classes. They ﬁnd that risky assets tend to be luxury goods
with high wealth elasticities.
13eﬀects, and cohort (birth-year) eﬀects on portfolio choice. Even if one has complete
panel data on portfolios of households over time, any pattern in the data can be ﬁt
equally well by age and time eﬀects, age and cohort eﬀects, or time and cohort eﬀects.
Theory suggests that there should be time eﬀects on portfolio choice if households
perceive changes over time in the risks or expected excess returns of risky assets.
Theory also suggests that there should be age eﬀects on portfolio choice if older
investors have shorter horizons than younger investors and investment opportunities
are time-varying, or if older investors have less human wealth relative to ﬁnancial
wealth than younger investors (Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson 1992, Campbell and
Viceira 2002). Thus it seems hard to rule out either time or age eﬀects in studying
portfolio choice. Cohort eﬀects are more problematic. In principle cohort eﬀects
could be caused by diﬀerent labor market experiences that aﬀect the ratio of human
to ﬁnancial wealth held by a cohort at each age, but this eﬀect is unlikely to be
strong in modern US conditions. Cohort eﬀects could also arise from diﬀerences
in preferences, perhaps driven by diﬀerent asset market experiences. Such eﬀects
cannot be identiﬁed by the data without modelling them (or age or time eﬀects) in
some way. I will follow Heaton and Lucas (2000) and most other studies by setting
cohort eﬀects to zero. Under this assumption age eﬀects can be estimated in any
cross-section.
Table I summarizes demographic eﬀects on asset allocation in the 2001 SCF. The
left panel of the table reports logit regressions of asset-class participation onto house-
hold income, wealth, and demographic characteristics.17 The right panel reports
regressions of portfolio shares onto the same variables, conditional on participation.
Within each panel, the ﬁrst regression looks at public equity (including equity held
in retirement accounts), and the second regression looks at private business assets.
Standard errors are reported below each coeﬃcient, and coeﬃcients signiﬁcant at the
10% level or better are indicated with stars. To illustrate the quantitative impor-
tance of each eﬀect in the logit regressions, the table also reports the participation
probability for a reference household, and the change in this probability caused by a
change in each dummy variable from zero to one, or a one standard deviation change
in each continuous variable.
The table shows that in the US in 2001, there was a weak negative age eﬀect on
17The inﬂuence of outliers is limited by truncating income and wealth at the 1st and 99th per-
centiles of the cross-sectional distribution. The regressions use logs of income and wealth, but
results are similar using the level of income rather than the log.
14participation in public equity markets.18 This result is presumably due to increased
participation by younger households during the 1990’s, and the fact that the regression
controls for wealth and income which tend to be higher for middle-aged households.
Unsurprisingly, households that report they have no tolerance for investment risk
are less likely to hold public equity. There are strong positive eﬀects of education,
income, and wealth on public equity participation.
Results are somewhat diﬀerent for private business ownership. Here there is a
humped age eﬀect, reﬂecting the tendency for younger households to acquire and
older households to sell oﬀ private businesses. Income has a U-shaped eﬀect on the
incidence of private business ownership, with a minimum at income of $250,000, and
wealth has an extremely powerful, but imprecisely estimated, quadratically increasing
eﬀect. Both these variables capture the strong tendency for the richest and highest-
income households to own private businesses. White households are more likely to
own private businesses, but there are no signiﬁcant eﬀects of education.
Turning to portfolio shares for participants, the main inﬂuence is wealth. For
both public equity and private business assets there is a quadratic pattern with a
minimum share at $70,000 for public equity and $85,000 for private equity. This
pattern reﬂects the fact that low-wealth households are likely to hold large portfolio
shares if they participate at all, but in the upper part of the wealth distribution
portfolio shares are strongly increasing in wealth. White and educated households
have higher portfolio shares in public equity than other households.
The regressions in Table I omit some variables that have been found to be impor-
tant in other studies. Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002) show that deﬁned beneﬁt
pension rights increase the allocation to risky assets, while self-employment decreases
it. Rosen and Wu (2004), using the Health and Retirement Study, show that poor self-
reported health decreases the allocation to risky assets. These eﬀects work strongly
through the participation decision, and also to some extent through asset allocation
conditional on participation. Poterba and Samwick (2003) show that households
with higher marginal tax rates are more likely to hold tax-advantaged assets such as
stock and tax-exempt bonds, and more likely to hold assets in tax-deferred accounts.
I have described household asset allocation at a point in time, but have not at-
18Stronger age eﬀects on equity market participation are reported by Bertaut and Starr-McCluer
(2002) for earlier SCF data, by Banks and Tanner (2002) for the UK, by Guiso and Jappelli (2002)
for Italy, and by Iwaisako (2003) for Japan.
15tempted to follow households through time to see how their asset allocations evolve.
As m a l lr e c e n tl i t e r a t u r ed o e st h i sa n dﬁnds strong evidence for inertia in asset allo-
cation. Participants in retirement savings plans rarely alter the allocations of their
contributions or rebalance their portfolios, and default options have long-lasting ef-
fects on these portfolios (Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden 2003, Ameriks and Zeldes
2004, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick 2002, 2004, Madrian and Shea 2001).
Capital gains and losses also generate little rebalancing in US survey data studied by
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2005).
C. Interpretation
How can we make sense of these empirical results? Textbook ﬁnancial theory
implies that all households, no matter how risk averse, should hold some equities if
the equity premium is positive. Thus limited participation in the equity market must
be due to a failure of one of the standard assumptions.
One possibility is that some households are unaware of the existence of stocks as
an asset class; over 35% of Italian households reported that they were unaware of
stocks in the late 1990’s (Guiso and Jappelli 2006), but this proportion is likely to be
much smaller in the United States. Alternatively, households may have nonstandard
preferences or may face ﬁxed costs, which may be either one-time-only entry costs or
ongoing participation costs. Fixed costs can explain why participation increases with
wealth, since a larger portfolio is more likely to justify the payment of a ﬁxed cost to
increase return. One-time entry costs imply strong positive age eﬀects, since a house-
hold will continue to participate once a ﬁxed entry cost has been paid; but ongoing
participation costs produce limited participation with weaker age eﬀects. Haliassos
and Bertaut (1995) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) show that moderate ongoing par-
ticipation costs can justify the nonparticipation of many US households, although not
the richest households.
Fixed participation costs can be interpreted in diﬀerent ways. One approach is to
think of ﬁxed costs as capturing time and money that must be spent in order to invest
in the stock market. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003), for example, points out that equity
ownership often complicates the preparation of tax returns. Alternatively, ﬁxed
costs may be an economist’s description of psychological factors that make equity
ownership uncomfortable for some households. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004),
for example, ﬁnd that households that interact less with other households in their
16community are less likely to own stocks, suggesting that households prefer to follow
ﬁnancial practices that they know they share with others. Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2005) ﬁnd that households that express reluctance to trust others are less
likely to own stocks. On this interpretation, nonparticipation can be regarded as
an investment mistake, one that households with high ﬁxed costs are more likely to
make.19
Both interpretations must confront the important eﬀect of education on equity
ownership. Table I shows that education directly predicts equity ownership, even
controlling for age, income, and wealth, and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2005) re-
port that the eﬀect of trust on equity ownership is weaker for educated households. It
is tempting to conclude that educated households have learned that nonparticipation
is an investment mistake, or as Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) put it, that “education
and the free acquisition of information are important in overcoming the barrier to
stockholding erected by ignorance and misperceptions”. While this conclusion is
probably correct, it is also plausible that education reduces the objective costs of
stock market participation. Related to this, in the next section I show that edu-
cated households in Sweden diversify their portfolios more eﬃciently, and therefore
can expect to earn higher returns per unit of risk if they do participate.
An interesting question is whether stock market participants are more risk-tolerant
than nonparticipants. If nonparticipants are relatively risk-averse, then small ﬁxed
costs suﬃce to deter them from participation. Carroll (2002) proposes a model in
which all agents have a common utility function with declining relative risk aversion,
and argues that this model explains the high participation rate and more aggressive
asset allocation of wealthy households. However Haliassos and Michaelides (2003)
and Gomes and Michaelides (2005) argue that risk-averse households have a strong
precautionary saving motive which leads them to accumulate more wealth. If there is
exogenous cross-sectional variation in risk aversion and the precautionary saving eﬀect
is strong enough, those households that are wealthy enough to pay the ﬁxed costs of
stock market participation may actually be more risk-averse than nonparticipating
households.
Other features of the data can be explained by the eﬀect of background risk on
portfolio choice. Self-employed households, and households with signiﬁcant private
19A similar issue of interpretation arises if one accounts for inertia in asset allocation by invoking
ﬁxed costs of portfolio rebalancing. Such ﬁxed costs may be objective, or simply another way to
describe an investment mistake.
17business assets, are exposed to private business risk that increases their eﬀective risk
aversion even if it is uncorrelated with returns on publicly traded equities. Private
business risk has an even stronger discouraging eﬀect on equity ownership if, as seems
plausible, it is positively correlated with public equity risk. If I include a dummy
for private business ownership in the public equity participation regression of Table
I, it enters negatively although not signiﬁcantly. The eﬀect of poor health on asset
allocation can also be understood as the eﬀect of background risk, in this case risk to
spending needs rather than risk to income.
III. Diversiﬁcation
A second major topic in household ﬁnance is how households construct their port-
folios within each asset class. Accurate measurement is signiﬁcantly more challenging
in this context, because we would ideally like to measure the holdings of each indi-
vidual asset, and survey data do not generally give this much detail. However a
large and ingenious empirical literature has explored the composition of household
stock portfolios using partial information from surveys (for example, on the decision
to hold any individual stocks, and the number of individual stocks held), tax re-
turns (which list dividends by payer and thus reveal individual stockholdings), and
brokerage accounts. The main conclusions of this literature are as follows.
First, many households own relatively few individual stocks. Analyses of the
Survey of Consumer Finances ﬁnd that among households that hold individual stocks
directly, the median number of stocks held was two until 2001, when it rose to three
(Blume and Friend 1975, Kelly 1995, Polkovnichenko 2005). Of course, many house-
holds own equity indirectly, through mutual funds or retirement accounts, and these
indirect holdings tend to be much better diversiﬁed.20 Thus it is not clear that
concentrated individual stockholdings have a large eﬀect on household portfolio risk.
Second, local bias, well known from aggregate data (French and Poterba 1991,
Cooper and Kaplanis 1994), shows up in household-level data both with respect
to domestic vs. foreign investments, and with respect to regional vs. non-regional
20Curcuru et al. (2004) deﬁne households to be undiversiﬁed if they hold more than 50% of
their equity in a brokerage account with fewer than 10 stocks. They ﬁnd that the fraction of
undiversiﬁed households has been declining, from almost a third of stockholding households, owning
21% of equity, in the 1989 SCF to 14% of households, owning 12% of equity, in the 2001 SCF.
Polkovnichenko (2005) also emphasizes the co-existence of mutual funds and individual stocks in
household portfolios.
18companies. Huberman (2001), using company records, ﬁnds that individual investors
prefer to own the stocks of their local telecommunications company. Zhu (2002),
using brokerage account data, ﬁnds that regional bias is stronger among investors
who do not own international stocks; this suggests a connection between the two
forms of local bias. Feng and Seasholes (2004) ﬁnd that Chinese investors overweight
not only local companies, but also companies that are traded on a local exchange,
suggesting that familiarity drives local bias.
Third, many US households have large holdings in the stock of their employer, par-
ticularly within their 401(k) retirement savings accounts (Mitchell and Utkus 2003).
Some of these holdings result from employer policies, but Benartzi (2001) shows that
a substantial fraction of unrestricted employee contributions go to employer stock
rather than diversiﬁed alternatives. This is especially true when the employer stock
has performed well over the previous decade, suggesting that households extrapolate
the past performance of the employer.21
Fourth, discount brokerage customers trade intensively (Odean 1999, Barber and
Odean 2000). This ﬁnding contrasts with the inertia in asset allocation found in
studies of retirement savings plans, probably because discount brokerage customers
tend to be households with a particular interest in equity trading. Brokerage cus-
tomers also display a disposition eﬀect: a tendency to sell winners and hold losers.
Odean (1998) shows that the propensity among brokerage customers to realize gains
is substantially greater than the propensity to realize losses, except in December when
tax-loss selling reverses the relationship. Selling winners can be a way to restore di-
versiﬁcation to a portfolio that has become excessively concentrated, but the tendency
to hold losers is hard to rationalize, both because it is tax-ineﬃcient and because it
lowers pre-tax returns to the extent that stocks display momentum.
Finally, there is heterogeneity in the strength of these eﬀects across households.
Puri and Robinson (2005), for example, show that households with optimistic beliefs
about their life expectancy place a higher portfolio weight on individual stocks even
though they do not place a higher overall weight on equities. Graham, Harvey,
and Huang (2005) ﬁnd that investors who claim to be comfortable with investment
products also tend to trade more frequently and to be more diversiﬁed internationally.
21However Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2004) ﬁnd that 401(k) plan participants reallo-
cate their portfolios by selling company stock after the stock rises, consistent with the disposition
eﬀect.
19There is an active debate about the performance of concentrated portfolios. Odean
(1999) ﬁnds that the stocks purchased by discount brokerage customers tend to un-
derperform the stocks sold by these households. Zhu (2002) argues that households
with a relatively weak local bias–which tend to have higher income and professional
status–outperform households with a stronger local bias. On the other hand Ivkovi´ c
and Weisbenner (2003) ﬁnd that households’ local investments outperform their non-
local ones, and Ivkovi´ c, Sialm, and Weisbenner (2004) ﬁnd that among wealthier
households, concentrated portfolios have higher average returns than diversiﬁed port-
folios although they also have higher risk and lower Sharpe ratios. All these studies
use account-level data from a discount brokerage.
A. Household risk exposures in Sweden
A weakness of this literature is that it cannot directly measure the risk exposures of
households. Surveys do not identify individual stocks or mutual funds, and brokerage
accounts do not reveal total portfolios. In joint research with Laurent Calvet and
Paolo Sodini (Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini 2006), I have used Swedish data to take a
more direct look at the idiosyncratic risk in Swedish household portfolios. We adopt
the perspective that systematic risk is compensated and idiosyncratic risk is not, so
that taking idiosyncratic risk is an investment mistake. Since the time dimension
of our dataset is short, we do not attempt to measure the performance of Swedish
household portfolios directly.
The Swedish data appear to be broadly consistent with US data as regards asset
allocation: at the aggregate level, real estate accounts for over 70% of household
assets, bank deposits and money market funds for 11%, directly held stocks and
mutual funds for 6% each, and bonds, derivatives, and capital insurance products
for the remainder. At the end of 2002, 62% of households participated in ﬁnancial
markets by holding ﬁnancial assets other than bank deposits and money market funds.
We construct a sample of 100,000 households and measure the composition of
their portfolios at the end of 2002, down to the level of individual stocks and mutual
funds. We calculate the risk properties of these portfolios by estimating a variance-
covariance matrix Σ for the returns of all stocks and mutual funds held by Swedish
households. Then, if a household h has portfolio weight vector ωh,t h ev a r i a n c e
of its portfolio return is estimated as ω0
hΣωh. This procedure captures the risk
in household portfolios at a point in time, although it does not track the trading
20decisions of households within the year.
The median household in our sample has a risky portfolio with a standard devia-
tion of 21%. Part of this standard deviation comes from exposure to systematic risk
in the world equity market, and part comes from unsystematic risk. As a measure
of systematic risk, we calculate the standard deviation of the ﬁtted value in a re-
gression of each household’s portfolio return on the dollar excess return of the MSCI
All World Index. For the median household, this systematic standard deviation is
14%. The standard deviation of the residual, a measure of unsystematic risk, is 16%,
implying that more than half of the median Swedish household’s portfolio variance is
idiosyncratic.
Although Swedish households can obtain the dollar excess return on international
stocks by hedging their currency exposure when they invest internationally, this may
be an unrealistic benchmark given that international equity funds widely marketed in
Sweden are not currency-hedged. If we repeat the above exercise with the Swedish
krona excess return on the MSCI index, we ﬁnd that slightly less than half of the
median household’s portfolio variance is idiosyncratic.
While the median standard deviation of the risky portfolio return is 21%, there is
wide variation in this number across households. Some households take low risk and
hold primarily bond funds; others take high risk. The 95th percentile of the risky
portfolio standard deviation is 51%, and the 99th percentile is 70%. Portfolios with
this level of risk tend to have betas above one, but they also have extremely high
shares of idiosyncratic as opposed to systematic risk.
To analyze idiosyncratic risk in a portfolio, it is helpful to consider a stylized
symmetrical model in which all the assets in the portfolio of household h have the
same idiosyncratic variance σ2
ah and the same correlation ρah with each other. It
is straightforward to show that the idiosyncratic variance of the household portfolio,
σ2
ih,s a t i s ﬁes
σ
2
ih = Cahσ
2
ah +( 1− Cah)ρahσ
2
ah, (1)
where Cah = ω0
hωh is a measure of the concentration of the overall portfolio. Let ¯ ca
denote the average value of logCah in the population, and ¯ Ca =e x p ( ¯ ca). Al o g l i n -
earization of (1) around ρah =0and cah =¯ ca implies
log(σih) ≈ logσah +
1
2
logCah +
1
2
µ
1
¯ Ca
− 1
¶
ρah. (2)
This decomposition relates log idiosyncratic portfolio standard deviation to the log
21of the average idiosyncratic standard deviation of assets in the portfolio, the log con-
centration of the portfolio, and the average correlation across assets in the portfolio.
The above analysis treats all assets in the portfolio equally, whether they are
stocks or mutual funds. An alternative approach is to assume that mutual funds are
fully diversiﬁed, with zero idiosyncratic risk. Let Dh denote the share of directly
held stocks in the risky portfolio, and let Csh = Cah/D2
h denote the concentration of
the stock portion of the portfolio. Then
log(σih) ≈ logDh +l o gσsh +
1
2
logCsh +
1
2
µ
1
¯ Cs
− 1
¶
ρsh, (3)
where s subscripts denote the characteristics of the directly held stocks in the port-
folio. This alternative decomposition attributes idiosyncratic risk to a high share of
stocks rather than mutual funds in the portfolio, volatile stocks, a concentrated stock
portfolio, and correlated stocks.
In the Swedish data, we ﬁnd that portfolios with high idiosyncratic risk tend to
have high shares of directly owned stocks, and the directly owned portfolios tend to
be concentrated in one or two volatile stocks. Concentration, however, can be a
misleading statistic; many portfolios with low idiosyncratic risk also contain one or
two directly owned stocks, but these portfolios are dominated by mutual funds and
contain only a small share of directly owned stocks. This pattern illustrates the
danger of looking only at the number of directly held stocks in a portfolio without
considering the broader context within which those stocks are held. Correlation
across stocks in the portfolio contributes very little to the cross-sectional risk pattern
in Swedish portfolios.
In order to evaluate the consequences of underdiversiﬁcation for household welfare,
we assume that mean returns on stocks and mutual funds obey an international asset
pricing model (either the CAPM or the three-factor Fama-French model, estimated in
dollars). This assumption avoids the diﬃcult task of estimating average returns on
individual stocks and mutual funds from short historical time series, while enabling
us to plot Swedish household portfolios on a mean-standard deviation diagram. By
assumption, all portfolios must fall below the eﬃcient frontier, which in the case of
the international CAPM is a straight line connecting the riskless rate to the currency-
hedged return on the MSCI world index. We ﬁnd that many household portfolios
come close to the Sharpe ratio of the unhedged world index (which we estimate at
35%), but almost none attain the eﬃcient Sharpe ratio of the currency-hedged world
22index, which we estimate at 45%. The Swedish domestic equity index, with an
estimated Sharpe ratio of 27%, lies within the middle of the distribution of household
portfolios.
There are several ways to measure portfolio ineﬃciency within this framework.
One is to calculate the percentage diﬀerence between a household portfolio’s Sharpe
ratio Sh and the Sharpe ratio of a benchmark index SB, 1 − Sh/SB. A second is
to calculate the return lost, at the portfolio’s given standard deviation, by the lower
Sharpe ratio of the household portfolio. This is wh(SBσh − μh),w h e r ewh is the
portfolio’s weight in risky assets, σh is the standard deviation of the household’s risky
portfolio return, and μh is the mean of that return. A third approach is to calculate
the utility lost by a household that correctly perceives its own Sharpe ratio, and
chooses its risk optimally given its risk aversion, but fails to understand that a higher
Sharpe ratio is available by investing eﬃciently. This utility loss is equivalent to a
decrease in the riskless interest rate of whσh(S2
B − S2
h)/2Sh.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁrst measure of portfolio ineﬃciency, the median Swedish house-
hold gives up slightly more than a third of the maximum available Sharpe ratio if the
international CAPM holds, and slightly less than a third if the international Fama-
French model holds. The diﬀerence is caused by the fact that Swedish household
portfolios are tilted towards small stocks and value stocks, which earn higher returns
in the Fama-French model than in the CAPM. The Sharpe ratio loss is reduced by
more than half if we take as our benchmark the world index in Swedish kronas rather
than the currency-hedged world index. The median Swedish household portfolio has
a higher Sharpe ratio than the Swedish equity index, reﬂecting the fact that many
Swedish households hold global equity mutual funds.
Reductions in Sharpe ratios have little eﬀect on portfolio returns if households
invest conservatively. The second measure of portfolio ineﬃciency places greater
weight on low Sharpe ratios that are accompanied by aggressive investment strategies.
If converted to dollars by multiplying by portfolio value, it also places greater weight
on large portfolios. The median Swedish household loses almost 1.2% return or about
$130 per year relative to the currency-hedged world index under the CAPM. Relative
to the unhedged world index, the median household loses only one quarter as much.
Clearly portfolio underdiversiﬁcation has only modest eﬀects on the welfare of the
median Swedish household.
Once again, however, there is wide variation in these numbers across households.
At the right tail of the distribution of return losses, these losses are substantial. The
2395th percentile of the return loss is 5.0% relative to the hedged world index, and
about half this relative to the unhedged index. In dollar units, the 95th percentile of
the loss is over $2200 per year relative to the hedged world index, and almost $850
per year relative to the unhedged index.
These numbers suggest that underdiversiﬁcation in household portfolios is a prob-
lem of a minority. The obvious next question is which households lose the most by
ineﬃcient investing. If the CAPM holds, the overall return loss can be written as
the product of three household-speciﬁca n do n em a r k e t - w i d ec o m p o n e n t :
wh(SBσh − μh)=whβh
µ
SB
Sh
− 1
¶
Er
e
m. (4)
Here wh is the share of the household’s portfolio invested in risky assets, βh is the
beta of those risky assets with the benchmark portfolio, (SB/Sh−1) is a transformed
measure of the relative Sharpe ratio, and Ere
m is the expected excess return on the
world market portfolio.
In Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2006) we take logs of both sides of this equation
and then regress the log return loss and its three household-speciﬁc components onto
demographic characteristics of households. We ﬁnd oﬀsetting eﬀects on return losses.
On the one hand, ﬁnancially sophisticated households with high disposable income,
wealth, education, private pension savings, and ﬁnancial liabilities tend to invest more
aggressively. They invest a higher fraction of their wealth in risky assets, and those
assets have higher betas. On the other hand these households also tend to invest
more eﬃciently, consistent with the ﬁndings of Goetzmann and Kumar (2004) for US
brokerage account data. In the Swedish data we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates,
so ﬁnancially sophisticated households actually have higher overall return losses.22
These results have two important limitations. First, they assume that mutual
fund returns to investors obey the CAPM. If mutual funds hold stocks that obey
the CAPM, and if they charge fees to investors, mutual funds will deliver returns
with negative alphas reﬂecting the fee drag. This eﬀect is likely to be signiﬁcant,
as Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) report average fees for equity funds ranging from
almost 100 basis points for S&P 500 index funds to over 225 basis points for global
22We also ﬁnd an age eﬀect on investment performance. Consistent with the ﬁndings of Korniotis
and Kumar (2006) in US brokerage account data, older households invest more cautiously but less
eﬃciently. These two eﬀects work against each other and almost cancel one another, so that overall
return losses are almost invariant to age.
24and international funds, with wide dispersion across individual funds. A priority for
future research will be to measure the fees charged by each mutual fund available to
Swedish investors and the eﬀect of these fees on household portfolio performance.
Second, I have treated the ﬁnancial portfolio in isolation and have not considered
the possibility that ﬁnancial assets are used to hedge households’ labor income risk.
Massa and Simonov (2003) explore this issue and ﬁnd that investors in general tend
to hold stocks that are positively correlated with their labor income, possibly because
these stocks are familiar to them, but that wealthy investors have a greater tendency
to pick negatively correlated stocks that can hedge their labor income risk. Massa
and Simonov’s results are consistent with the theme of this paper that sophisticated
households come closer to the investment strategies recommended by standard ﬁnan-
cial theory.
An important question is to what extent the results for Sweden describe house-
hold behavior in other countries. There are several reasons to think that Swedish
households may diversify more eﬀectively than households elsewhere. Sweden is a
country with a well educated population and an unusually high stock market partic-
ipation rate; it is a small country, so Swedish investors are used to the idea that they
must diversify internationally; and Swedish households were exposed to a national
campaign of ﬁnancial education in the late 1990’s as part of a reform of the pension
system.
It will also be important to try to understand the implications of underdiversiﬁ-
cation for the wealth distribution. Household underdiversiﬁcation has the potential
to explain the puzzling dispersion of wealth at retirement reported in US data by
Venti and Wise (2001). Venti and Wise argue that diﬀerences in lifetime earnings
or asset allocation do not explain dispersion, and conclude that it must be caused by
diﬀerences in savings propensities. But poorly diversiﬁed stock investments could
also explain a great deal of dispersion.
B. Diversiﬁcation and participation
T h ed e m o g r a p h i cp r e d i c t o r so fp o r t f o l i oi n e ﬃciency in Sweden are strikingly sim-
ilar to the demographic predictors of nonparticipation and cautious investing in both
Sweden and the US (see Table I). This suggests that some households may fail to
invest in stocks, or invest only cautiously in stocks, in part because they are aware
that they lack the skills to invest eﬃciently. They may correctly calculate lower
25welfare beneﬁts of participation given their investment skills, or they may simply
feel uncomfortable participating in an activity for which they are poorly prepared
(this can be interpreted as a higher psychological ﬁxed cost of participation). To
show the relevance of the ﬁrst channel, Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini calculate the
extra return that stock market participation can give a household with the typical
demographic characteristics of nonparticipants, assuming that this household invests
with the eﬃciency predicted by a demographic regression. The implied increase in
portfolio return is slightly lower than the increase for a household that invests with
the average eﬃciency of Swedish households, and only about half the increase for a
household that invests fully eﬃciently. Put another way, the ﬁxed costs that are
needed to deter participation are smaller when households correctly anticipate their
own limitations as investors.
There is other more direct evidence for a relation between skills, knowledge, and
investment behavior. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) ﬁnd that people who incorrectly
answer simple questions about investing are less likely to plan for retirement, while
Graham, Harvey, and Huang (2005) ﬁnd that investors who claim to be comfortable
about their “ability to understand investment products, alternatives, and opportuni-
ties” trade more frequently and are more internationally diversiﬁed. Of course, there
could be reverse causality from investment activity to understanding of investments,
but this cannot explain the ﬁnding of Benjamin and Shapiro (2005) that people with
low cognitive ability, as measured by standardized tests administered in youth, are
less likely to participate in ﬁnancial markets or accumulate assets during their subse-
quent adult life. In the next section of this address, I use demographic evidence to
argue that skills and knowledge are also important in another ﬁnancial context, the
ﬁnancing of housing by mortgage debt.
IV. Household Mortgage Decisions
The data on asset allocation reveal the importance of housing and the associated
mortgage debt for typical households. Yet there has been surprisingly little work on
mortgage decisions from the household point of view. Most research on mortgages
is done by specialists in real estate or ﬁxed-income securities who are interested in
pricing mortgage-backed derivatives.23
23The following classic articles on prepayment of ﬁxed-rate mortgages all concentrate on the
implications of prepayment for the valuation of mortgage-backed securities, and all include the word
26Mortgage contracts take a bewildering variety of forms, but the two main types are
nominal ﬁxed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). In the
United States, FRMs predominate, accounting for 72% of newly issued mortgages on
average over the period 1985—2005 according to the Federal Housing Finance Board
(FHFB). Since FRMs have a longer average life before repayment, they account for
an even larger fraction of the stock of mortgages at any point in time. Most FRMs
have 30-year maturities at issue, must be reﬁnanced when a borrower moves (that is,
they cannot be assumed by a new borrower), and can be reﬁnanced at the borrower’s
discretion without penalty at any time.
There is interesting variation over time in the use of ARMs. Figure 4, an update of
as i m i l a rﬁgure in Campbell and Cocco (2003), plots the FRM share of new mortgages
originated by major lenders over the period 1985—2005. The ﬁgure also plots the
typical ARM rate and 30-year FRM rate, and the spread between them. The ﬁgure
shows that homeowners are more likely to use ARMs when the FRM rate has recently
increased, and are more likely to use FRMs when the FRM rate has recently decreased.
There is also some evidence that homeowners respond to the spread between the
A R Mr a t ea n dt h eF R Mr a t e ,b u tt h i sd o e sn o ts e e mt oe x p l a i na l lt h em o v e m e n t s
in the FRM share. In 1990—93 and 2001—02, for example, the spread widened yet
homeowners did not shift toward ARMs. The correlation between the FRM share
and the spread is -0.42, while the correlation between the FRM share and the lagged
one-year change in the FRM rate is -0.51. If one regresses the FRM share on the
spread and the lagged change in the FRM rate, both variables are highly signiﬁcant;
and the lagged change in the FRM rate remains signiﬁcant even if one includes one
lag of the spread to capture inertia in mortgage decisions.
The problem of choosing an optimal mortgage contract is a complex one, as il-
lustrated by the stylized model of Appendix A and the numerical model solved by
Campbell and Cocco (2003). Households must take into consideration real interest
rate risk, inﬂation risk, borrowing constraints today and the possibility of borrowing
constraints in the future, their risk aversion, their moving probability, and their abil-
ity to reﬁnance a ﬁxed-rate mortgage optimally. However it is hard to rationalize the
time-series variation shown in Figure 4 using a standard model of household optimiza-
tion. A wide spread between the short-term and long-term interest rate should make
ARMs attractive to households that are currently borrowing-constrained or likely
to move in the near future, but the recent movement of the long-term interest rate
“valuation” in their titles: Dunn and McConnell (1981), Schwartz and Torous (1989), McConnell
and Singh (1994), Stanton (1995), LeRoy (1996), and Longstaﬀ (2004).
27should not be a relevant state variable except insofar as it predicts future movements
in long-term rates. The data do not suggest that changes in long-term interest rates
are highly autocorrelated, and it would be surprising if they were as this would imply
large predictable variation in bond returns. In summary, some households appear
to choose between FRMs and ARMs as if they irrationally believe that long-term
interest rates are mean-reverting.24
A. Reﬁnancing
The option to reﬁnance a ﬁxed-rate mortgage means that households do not have
to pay a ﬁxed rate that greatly exceeds the current level of mortgage rates. When
interest rates fall, households have an incentive to reﬁnance their mortgages, either
reducing their monthly payments for a ﬁxed level of mortgage debt, or increasing their
debt while maintaining the same monthly payments. The latter practice is known as
home equity extraction, and has attracted the attention of the Federal Reserve Board
for its possible impact on consumer spending (Greenspan and Kennedy 2005).
Reﬁnancing incurs a substantial one-time cost and thus is not optimal unless the
spread between a household’s existing mortgage rate and the currently available rate
is large enough to cover this cost.25 Since interest rates are volatile, the option to
delay reﬁnancing is valuable and the spread must also cover the loss in option value
caused by reﬁnancing. Agarwal, Driscoll, and Laibson (2006) estimate the spread
that justiﬁes reﬁnancing at 1.1—1.4% for mortgages between $100,000 and $200,000
in size.
Declining interest rates in recent years have created large incentives to reﬁnance,
and it is generally thought that households have become more responsive to such
incentives (Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani 2001). Despite this, a large minority of
households pay interest rates on old ﬁxed-rate mortgages that greatly exceed the
currently available rate. Figure 5 summarizes the distribution of rates paid on 30-
24Some personal ﬁnance books encourage the belief that long rates are predictable. Steinmetz
(2002), for example, advises “If you think rates are going up, get a ﬁxed-rate mortgage” (p.48), and
Irwin (1996) implicitly assumes mean-reversion when he writes “When interest rates are low, get a
ﬁxed-rate mortgage and lock in the low rate” (p.143).
25The reﬁnancing cost includes the lender’s application and attorney review fees, appraisal and
home inspection fees, title search and title insurance fees, hazard insurance, the loan origination
fee, and mortgage insurance. Agarwal, Driscoll, and Laibson (2006) estimate the reﬁnancing cost
during the 1990’s at $2,000 plus 1% of mortgage value.
28year ﬁxed-rate mortgages in 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003. The underlying data are
taken from the American Housing Survey (AHS), a data source described in Appendix
B and analyzed by Schwartz (2006). For each spread over the current mortgage rate,
the ﬁgure shows the fraction of households that pay more than this rate. The data
show a striking diﬀerence between the 2003 survey and the surveys conducted in 1997,
1999, and 2001. In the three earlier years, rates had been stable or gently declining
in the two years prior to the survey. Around a quarter of households were paying
mortgage rates more than 1% above the currently prevailing rate, 15-20% were paying
r a t e sm o r et h a n1 . 5 %a b o v e ,1 2 - 1 4 %w e r ep a y i n gm o r et h a n2 %a b o v e ,a n d6 - 8 %w e r e
paying rates more than 3% above the current rate. High mortgage rates tended to
be paid on slightly smaller mortgages, so the shares of mortgage value that paid high
rates were somewhat lower; for example, 9-12% of mortgage dollar value was paying
more than 2% above the currently available rate.
In 2003, ﬁxed mortgage rates had declined precipitously in the two years prior to
the survey, as illustrated in Figure 4. Although reﬁnancing increased dramatically
in 2002 and 2003, by the time of the 2003 survey this had not caught up with the
lower available mortgage rate, leading the distribution of mortgage spreads to shift to
the right. In 2003 more than half the households surveyed were paying a spread of
more than 1%, more than a third were paying more than 1.5%, a quarter were paying
more than 2%, and an eighth were paying more than 3%. Again these numbers are
slightly lower when calculated as shares of dollar value, but almost 20% of mortgage
dollars were paying spreads of more than 2% in 2003.
The sluggishness of household reﬁnancing has been a major theme of the literature
on valuation of mortgage-backed securities. Early work by Dunn and McConnell
(1981) assumed costless reﬁnancing, and failed to ﬁt the behavior of mortgage-backed
securities prices. The subsequent literature has either worked with reduced-form
econometric models of prepayment rates (Schwartz and Torous 1989) or has speciﬁed
a cross-sectional distribution of reﬁnancing costs across households to account for
the willingness of some households to pay high mortgage spreads. Further realism
can be achieved by adding an exogenous delay to reﬁnancing (McConnell and Singh
1994, Stanton 1995). The parameters of these models themselves evolve over time,
generating random variations in prepayment speed that create an unhedgeable risk in
the cash ﬂows of mortgage-backed securities. Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron
(2006) argue that this accounts for the option-adjusted spread commonly used to
value these securities.
29This work generally does not explore the underlying economic causes of slow house-
hold reﬁnancing. Some households may be prevented from reﬁnancing by declines in
their house value that have eroded their home equity, or by declines in their income
that have decreased their creditworthiness. The lock-in eﬀect of declining house prices
is emphasized by Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997), and Archer, Ling, and McGill
(1996) ﬁnd that households with insuﬃcient collateral value or income are less likely
to respond to reﬁnancing incentives. But it is also plausible that sluggish reﬁnancing
is an investment mistake, on a par with nonparticipation or underdiversiﬁcation.26
In support of this view, Table II reports characteristics of households that did
not move but reﬁnanced their ﬁxed-rate mortgages between 2001 and 2003, a period
when rates fell dramatically and created large incentives to reﬁnance. The ﬁrst panel
of the table reports a probit regression of a reﬁnancing dummy onto household char-
acteristics, using data from the American Housing Survey. The regression includes
dummy variables for the mortgage origination year to control for variation in the
incentive to reﬁnance created by time-series variation in prevailing mortgage rates.
As in Table I, the reﬁnancing probability for a reference household is reported along
with the change in this probability caused by a change in each dummy variable, or a
one standard deviation change in each continuous variable.
The ﬁrst two explanatory variables in Table II capture constraints that may pre-
vent some borrowers from reﬁnancing. The variable “loan problem” is a dummy
variable that equals one if the current principal value of the mortgage exceeds 90%
of the self-reported value of the house. The variable “income problem” is a dummy
variable that equals one if the mortgage payments that would be required by a reﬁ-
nanced 30-year FRM exceed 28% of current self-reported income. These dummies
were used by Archer, Ling, and McGill (1996), who emphasized their important ef-
fects on mortgage reﬁnancing during the 1980’s. In Table II they enter with the
theoretically predicted negative signs, but only the loan problem is economically or
statistically signiﬁcant. The weakness of these eﬀects compared with those reported
by Archer et al. may be due to relaxed standards for mortgage lending in recent
years, or to the rise in house prices that has reduced the fraction of households with
insuﬃcient home equity.
26Consistent with this interpretation, sluggish reﬁnancers are known in the mortgage industry as
“woodheads”. Agarwal, Driscoll, and Laibson (2006) point out that some households make the
opposite mistake, reﬁnancing when the mortgage spread is just enough to cover the ﬁxed cost of
reﬁnancing but ignoring the option to delay and thus reﬁnancing too quickly.
30The remaining variables in Table II capture the demographic characteristics of
each household along with its income, the value of its house, and the size of its
mortgage. Quadratic terms are included in the last three variables to capture possible
nonlinearities, but are not of major importance. The results show that younger,
smaller, better educated, better oﬀ white households with more expensive houses
were more likely to reﬁnance their mortgages between 2001 and 2003. These patterns
suggest that prompt reﬁnancing requires ﬁnancial sophistication.
A household may rationally fail to reﬁnance its mortgage if it expects to move.
Households that expect to move and actually do move will be dropped from the
reﬁnancing regression, while households that expect to move and do not move will be
recorded as non-reﬁnancers. Thus one explanation for the results in the ﬁrst panel
of Table II could be that more sophisticated households are less mobile. The second
panel of Table II estimates the determinants of mobility within a larger sample of
households surveyed in 2001. Those that moved between 2001 and 2003 (as identiﬁed
by a diﬀerent household answering survey questions at the same address in 2003, about
9% of the sample) are recorded as movers, while those that responded to both the 2001
and 2003 surveys at the same address are recorded as non-movers. The regressions
show that almost all the determinants of reﬁnancing probability, notably age, race,
education, family size, and home value, aﬀect mobility in the same direction. Thus
mobility does not seem to be a plausible explanation for the cross-sectional variation
in the propensity to reﬁnance.27
As further support for the interpretation that sluggish reﬁnancing is an investment
mistake, the third panel of Table II reports demographic determinants of implausi-
ble self-reported mortgage rates. As discussed in Appendix B, some households
in the AHS report that their current mortgage rates are implausibly low, over two
percentage points below the average mortgage rate prevailing during the origination
period. If these households do not understand that their current rates are high, it is
understandable that they might fail to take advantage of a reﬁnancing opportunity.
About 7% of households report implausibly low mortgage rates, and most of these
households took out their mortgages more than 10 years ago. The third panel of
Table II shows that this reporting error is much more common among less educated
27Some households may have moved as an endogenous response to declining mortgage rates,
reﬁnancing in order to buy a larger house. To the extent that this behavior is more common among
sophisticated households, it will lead the regression in the ﬁrst panel of Table II, which includes only
non-moving households, to understate the eﬀect of sophistication on reﬁnancing.
31households.28
The last two columns of Table II push this investigation further by examining the
d e t e r m i n a n t so ft h em o r t g a g er a t et h a th o u s e h o l d sp a ya ta n yp o i n ti nt i m e . T h e
regressions are run separately for the 2001 and 2003 surveys. In each case the depen-
dent variable is the self-reported mortgage rate, adjusted to correct for implausible
rates as described in Appendix B. The regression includes dummy variables for the
year of house purchase.
The variables that predict prompt reﬁnancing behavior also generally predict low
mortgage rates. The loan problem and income problem dummies from Archer et
al. (1996) have a positive and strongly signiﬁcant eﬀect on mortgage rates paid in
both years. Education has a negative eﬀect in 2001 which strengthens in 2003,
reﬂecting the importance of education in driving prompt reﬁnancing in 2002 and
2003. The eﬀect of race also becomes signiﬁcant in 2003. Income and home value
have relatively weak eﬀects on mortgage rates paid, but the value of the mortgage
has a strong eﬀect; a one standard deviation increase in the mortgage size above
the sample mean lowers the mortgage rate by 44 basis points in 2001, and 49 basis
points in 2003. Presumably the mortgage variable captures both mortgage size as a
proxy for household wealth, and a reverse causality eﬀect that households with the
credit quality and sophistication to obtain cheaper mortgages tend to take out larger
mortgages.
One diﬃculty with these regressions is that they confound the eﬀects of reﬁnancing
decisions with the mortgage rate that a household can obtain at a point in time. It
may well be that better-educated households have better credit quality and can obtain
mortgages on more favorable terms.29 But if one eliminates cross-sectional variation
in rates available at a point in time by replacing self-reported mortgage rates with
average FHLMC rates prevailing at the mortgage origination date, the results are
28The reporting error is relatively rare for the reference household in Table II because this house-
hold has a mortgage of average age rather than an old mortgage. When the reporting error dummy
is included directly in the regression predicting reﬁnancing, it enters negatively but is not statistically
signiﬁcant. Bucks and Pence (2006) present complementary evidence on ARM borrowers. They
ﬁnd that many households, especially lower-income households, do not understand the potential
increase in their ARM rate that can be caused by rising interest rates.
29Moore (2003) surveys mortgage borrowers in Washington State, including “victims” who bor-
rowed from a predatory lender. She ﬁnds that the victims were more likely to lack basic ﬁnancial
knowledge, suggesting that they failed to understand the cost of their mortgage loans. However
she also ﬁnds that the victims were more likely to be in ﬁnancial distress, implying that they might
have had diﬃculty obtaining more favorable loans.
32similar to those reported in Table II. In particular, the eﬀects of race and education
remain signiﬁcant.
An interesting question is whether less sophisticated households can anticipate
their inability to reﬁnance FRMs optimally. If so, a rational response might be to
use an ARM instead. Schwartz (2006) looks at the determinants of ARM usage in
the AHS and ﬁnds no evidence that less sophisticated households use ARMs. Dur-
ing the earlier survey years, ARMs were favored by younger households ﬁnancing
their ﬁrst houses and with relatively small mortgages. This is consistent with the
model of Campbell and Cocco (2003) and Appendix A, in which mobile and currently
borrowing-constrained households should be attracted by the low initial cost of an
ARM unless a large mortgage makes its interest-rate risk unacceptable. During the
later survey years, and particularly in 2003, ARMs were favored by better educated
households. It is striking that 2003 was a year of an unusually wide spread between
FRM and ARM rates, even though FRM rates were low; thus sophisticated house-
holds should have been attracted to ARMs while unsophisticated households may
have anticipated rapid mean-reversion in long rates and may have avoided ARMs
for that reason. This interpretation is speculative, but can be tested by a more
systematic investigation of the response of households with diﬀerent education levels
to movements in mortgage rates.
Overall, it does not seem that households that lack the knowledge to reﬁnance
FRMs substitute away from these mortgage contracts in a way that would be analo-
gous to nonparticipation as a response to lack of knowledge about the stock market.
Presumably the lack of a simple alternative is a barrier to this response in the mort-
gage market.
V. Equilibrium in Retail Financial Markets
Given the complexity of the household ﬁnancial optimization problem, it may
not be surprising that some households make mistakes. For example, to reﬁnance a
ﬁxed-rate mortgage optimally one must solve an irreversible investment problem and
this is a diﬃcult task. What is perhaps surprising is that so many of the contracts
available to households reward sophisticated decisionmaking and continuous monitor-
ing of ﬁnancial markets. One might expect that simpler contracts would be oﬀered
that would leave less room for expensive mistakes. Economists often recommend
such instruments. Speciﬁcally, economists have often recommended mortgages that
33adjust interest and principal payments for inﬂation, thereby combining the best fea-
tures of nominal FRMs and ARMs (Statman 1982, Alm and Follain 1984, McCulloch
1986). More recently, Flesaker and Ronn (1993) and Nalebuﬀ and Ayres (2003)
have proposed an automatically reﬁnancing nominal FRM that would eliminate slug-
gish reﬁnancing and also save consumers the considerable costs of current reﬁnancing
procedures.30
Despite these recommendations, ﬁnancial innovation in retail markets often ap-
pears to proceed slowly. There is considerable inertia in the general form of mortgage
contracts, despite robust competition by mortgage lenders and changes over time in
credit standards. A related puzzle is that diﬀerent types of mortgages are standard in
diﬀerent countries. In the UK, for example, adjustable-rate mortgages are standard
and ﬁxed-rate mortgages of the US variety are almost unknown (Miles 2003, Green
and Wachter 2005).
In this section I argue that the existence of unsophisticated households helps to
explain these phenomena. A ﬁrst and perhaps obvious point is that unsophisticated
households tend to use whatever ﬁnancial contracts are standard in a particular coun-
try, possibly because they follow the lead of relatives and neighbors. It is expensive
for would-be ﬁnancial innovators to reach such households, particularly if they need
to explain a complex new ﬁnancial product. Second, the absence of eﬀective patent
protection in the ﬁnancial industry makes it hard for ﬁnancial innovators to recoup
the costs of advertising and ﬁnancial education needed to establish a new product.
Even if these two points are valid, why cannot ﬁnancial innovators establish a
foothold by attracting sophisticated households who understand the beneﬁts of a
new ﬁnancial product? Once sophisticated households adopt the product, other
households might follow. The explanation here may be that existing products often
involve a cross-subsidy from naive to sophisticated households. A reﬁnanceable
ﬁxed-rate mortgage, for example, oﬀers a low rate in part because many households
do not optimally reﬁnance. Sophisticated households gain by pooling with naive
households, and will not be attracted to a new mortgage if it is only taken up by
other sophisticated households.
To understand this possibility, consider a market in which a fraction α of the
population is naive (denoted by N) and the remainder is sophisticated (S). An
30Automatic reﬁnancing has a close parallel in the automatically refunding “ratchet” bond issued
by the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1998 (Kalotay and Abreo 1999).
34existing mortgage contract can be provided at overall cost C0, but is structured in
such a way that sophisticated households pay a lower cost than naive households.
For example, there may be a reﬁnancing option which only sophisticated households
exercise. In competitive equilibrium with full participation by both groups, their
costs must be related by
αC0N +( 1− α)C0S = C0. (5)
Write x for the cross-subsidy from the naive to the sophisticated: x = C0N − C0S.
Then
C0S = C0 − αx. (6)
The mortgage costs of the sophisticated fall with the fraction of naive households,
and the size of the cross-subsidy.
Now suppose that a new mortgage contract is invented that provides the same
beneﬁts at lower cost C1 = C0 −g. The new contract might for example be an auto-
matically reﬁnancing mortgage that reduces the costs of reﬁnancing, or an inﬂation-
indexed mortgage that reduces the need to reﬁnance. Assume that the new contract
is made available initially to a negligible fraction of the population, so that its intro-
duction does not perturb the pricing of the existing contract. In the simplest setting
only sophisticated households can understand the new product, but all households
can be reached costlessly. Sophisticated households opting for the new product gain
directly from its lower cost, but lose indirectly by giving up the cross-subsidy. They
will switch to the new product only if it oﬀers a social gain–a cost saving–larger
than the per-capita cross-subsidy from naive households using the existing product:
g>α x . (7)
New products with smaller social gains will not be adopted.
More realistically, suppose that a new product can be advertised at per capita cost
k, but only sophisticated households understand the advertisement. Such households
will switch to the new product if it oﬀers them a cost C0S−s = C1+g−αx−s,w h e r e
s is a switching cost. If a monopolist oﬀering the new product charges this cost, it
will make a proﬁto fg − αx − s on each customer. It will be worth advertising the
new product only if advertising attracts enough customers, that is, if
(1 − α)(g − αx − s) >k . (8)
Even a product that appeals to sophisticated consumers may not gain a foothold if
such consumers are diﬃcult to reach. In this case ﬁnancial education–a reduction
35in the fraction of naive households–has a positive eﬀect on ﬁnancial innovation both
by increasing the eﬀectiveness of advertising the new product, and by reducing the
cross-subsidy that each sophisticated household receives in the existing product.
Is it worthwhile for ﬁnancial innovators to oﬀer ﬁnancial education privately, con-
verting a small number of households from naive to sophisticated? It may not be,
for the same reason that sophisticated households may not be attracted to new prod-
ucts at a price that covers the cost of recruiting them. Newly educated households
understand the cross-subsidy they receive from naive households, and may refuse to
switch to a new product oﬀered along with ﬁnancial education. Instead, innovators
may have an incentive to mislead naive households by oﬀering confusing products
with high fees. The possibility of such perverse ﬁnancial innovation depends on the
details of naive investors’ behavior, and deserves further theoretical and empirical
research.
These eﬀects are an example of “shrouded equilibrium” (Ellison 2005, Gabaix
and Laibson 2006), in which some consumers are unaware of hidden costs associated
with certain products. It may not pay competitors to reveal these hidden costs
if sophisticated consumers have the ability to avoid them while still purchasing the
products, which are cheaper because of the revenue provided by naive consumers.
Gabaix and Laibson concentrate on examples in which the hidden costs are associated
with expensive add-ons (such as cartridges for ink-jet printers or telephone calls from
hotel rooms), whereas in the example of a reﬁnanceable mortgage the hidden costs
arise from consumer failure to understand an advantageous option.31
The eﬀect of hidden costs on the equilibrium of a retail ﬁnancial market has
recently been emphasized by Miles (2003). David Miles was commissioned by the
British Chancellor of the Exchequer to review the state of the UK mortgage market,
and in particular to understand why ﬁxed-rate mortgages are so much less popular
in the UK than in the US and many European countries. His interim report (2003)
argues that in the UK mortgage market, adjustable-rate mortgages are often sold with
discounted initial rates (sometimes called teaser rates) that automatically adjust to
a much higher “standard variable rate” after two years. Borrowers have the right
31Hidden costs may also be important in the mutual fund industry. Barber, Odean, and Zheng
(2003) show that operating expenses have a lower eﬀect on mutual fund ﬂows than more visible
front-end loads. In this case sophisticated investors do not have the ability to avoid such fees so
they do not receive a cross-subsidy from naive investors; but high-fee mutual funds may still survive
if naive investors are costly to reach through ﬁnancial advertising (Sirri and Tufano 1998, Hortacsu
and Syverson 2004).
36to reﬁnance their mortgages without penalty after two years, yet the teaser rates are
extremely attractive relative to prevailing money market rates.32 Miles concludes that
mortgage lenders can only oﬀer these rates because many households (close to a third
of borrowers in 2003) fail to reﬁnance their mortgages and end up paying standard
variable rate. He argues that the resulting cross-subsidy from naive to sophisticated
households inhibits the development of a ﬁxed-rate mortgage market in the UK. By
contrast with the US, where ﬁxed-rate mortgages are standard and are widely used by
naive households, in the UK they are considered only by sophisticated borrowers who
are reluctant to give up the attractive rates available in the adjustable-rate market.
I nt h eU S ,as i m i l a rm e c h a n i s mm a yk e e pd o w nt h ec o s to fs t a n d a r dr e ﬁnanceable
ﬁxed-rate mortgages. The excess mortgage interest shown in Figure 5 is large enough
to have a noticeable eﬀect on the mortgage rates oﬀered by competitive lenders. In
2001, for example, the total payments made by households in the AHS were higher
by 0.66% of mortgage value than they would have been if interest were capped at 1%
above the current mortgage rate. The excess interest was somewhat lower in 1997
and 1999 at 53 and 43 basis points, respectively, but much higher in 2003 at 107 basis
points. The numbers are similar if one eliminates cross-sectional variation in credit
quality by using the FHLMC rate prevailing at each mortgage origination date rather
than the self-reported mortgage rate. Thus excess interest reﬂects the failure of
naive borrowers to reﬁnance their mortgages, rather than cross-sectional variation in
credit quality, and can be thought of as a hidden cost of the sort discussed by Gabaix
and Laibson. Of course, these numbers are only suggestive as they reﬂect outcomes
along a single, declining path for mortgage rates rather than a probability-weighted
average across all possible rate scenarios, and they are measured relative to current
rates rather than minimum rates.
Hidden costs may also be important in another aspect of US mortgage markets.
Borrowers have the option of paying mortgage origination costs, including perhaps
a fee to a mortgage broker, in the form of cash up front (“points”) or by paying a
higher interest rate on the mortgage. The conventional analysis of this arrangement
(e.g. Stanton and Wallace 1998) emphasizes that it is a way for mortgage lenders to
separate households by moving probability. Households that expect to move soon are
32In October 2003, for example, one-month sterling LIBOR was 3.63%, and the discounted ad-
justable rate was only 7 basis points higher at 3.70%. Two-year LIBOR was 4.51%, and the
discounted initial rate on a mortgage with a two-year ﬁxed interest period was 2 basis points lower
at 4.49%. The adjustable rate for mortgages with no initial discount was 4.51% and the standard
variable rate was 5.42%, 88 basis points and 179 basis points respectively above one-month LIBOR.
37willing to pay points; they receive a lower rate because the reﬁnancing option is less
valuable for these households, and thus less costly for mortgage lenders to provide to
them. Woodward (2003), however, argues that points also increase the opportunity
for mortgage brokers to confuse borrowers. In a sample of 2700 mortgage loans with
average mortgage broker fees of almost $2500, she ﬁnds that households tend to pay
higher broker fees on mortgages with points, and that college education is associated
with a remarkable $1500 reduction in average broker fees. In a competitive market
for mortgage brokerage services, broker fees may be lower for sophisticated households
because of the high fees paid by naive households.
An important question is whether public policy can improve outcomes in ﬁnan-
cial markets with naive households. Financial education is certainly helpful, and an
audience of ﬁnancial educators is likely to agree on its importance. However one
should not overestimate the power of education; in particular, the education vari-
ables in demographic regressions are endogenous, proxying for cognitive ability and
other omitted factors, and so they may overstate the eﬀects of exogenous increases in
education on investment behavior.
Regulation to prohibit “predatory lending” and excessive cross-subsidy may also
b eh e l p f u l ,b u ta sG a b a i xa n dL a i b s o ne m p h a s i z e ,i ti sd i ﬃcult to design regulations
that protect naive households without also inhibiting helpful innovation. For ex-
ample, regulations that prevent negative amortization in mortgage contracts, which
are intended to protect households from incurring unmanageable debts, also prevent
inﬂation-adjustment of principal if amortization is deﬁn e di nn o m i n a lt e r m s .
Public policy can subsidize suitable ﬁnancial instruments through tax incentives or
credit guarantees. Swensen (2005) argues that low-cost passive mutual funds should
be subsidized in this way. In mortgage markets, the US government plays a major
role through GNMA and its sponsorship of FNMA and FHLMC. The ability of these
agencies to issue low-cost debt has likely reduced the cost of the mortgages they hold
(Green and Wachter 2005). The agencies have traditionally favored nominal ﬁxed-
rate mortgages, and it is plausible that they could encourage the use of mortgages
with inﬂation adjustment or automatic reﬁnancing features.
Disclosure requirements can reduce the incidence of investment mistakes, but here
too they must be designed appropriately. Miles (2004) points out that in the UK
the annual percentage rate (APR) on a mortgage–the main cost measure considered
by prospective borrowers–is calculated under the assumption that interest rates will
remain unchanged during the life of the mortgage. This assumption tends to under-
38state the cost of an adjustable rate mortgage when the yield curve is upward sloping,
for then forward rates exceed spot rates, suggesting that the bond market expects in-
terest rates to rise. Miles recommends that the APR should be calculated under the
assumption that spot rates at all future dates will equal the corresponding forward
rates prevailing at the disclosure date. Disclosure requirements will be increasingly
important if households come to rely more heavily on mortgage calculators and other
ﬁnancial websites to compare ﬁnancial products.
Finally, recent research in behavioral ﬁnance has found that default options–
standard choices that households believe to be recommended by authoritative bodies–
have a powerful eﬀect on household behavior (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick
2002, 2004). The mortgage policies of GNMA, FNMA, and FHLMC may inﬂuence
household mortgage decisions through this channel as well as by driving down the
cost of standard mortgage contracts.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper I have outlined the ﬁeld of household ﬁnance. I have argued that al-
though many households ﬁnd adequate solutions to the complex investment problems
they face, some households make serious investment mistakes. These mistakes come
in a variety of forms. I have emphasized nonparticipation in risky asset markets,
underdiversiﬁcation of risky portfolios, and failure to exercise options to reﬁnance
mortgages.
Investment mistakes have a number of interesting characteristics that make them
central to the study of household ﬁnance. First, it appears that poorer and less
educated households are more likely to make mistakes than wealthier and better edu-
cated households. This pattern reinforces the interpretation of nonstandard behavior
as reﬂecting mistakes rather than nonstandard preferences.
Second, some mistakes may result from eﬀorts to avoid others. The same types
of households that tend to invest poorly are more likely not to participate in risky
asset markets at all. Nonparticipating households may be aware of their limited
investment skill and may react by withdrawing from risky markets altogether. Other
households, wishing to delegate ﬁnancial decisions to professionals, may pay high fees
to ﬁnancial planners, mutual funds, or banks.
Third, the presence of households that make investment mistakes may inhibit
39ﬁnancial innovation. Many investment products allow some degree of cross-subsidy
from naive households to sophisticated ones that optimally exploit embedded options.
It may be diﬃcult for new investment products to gain acceptance if sophisticated
households, who are the natural early adopters, must give up the beneﬁt of a cross-
subsidy when they move from an existing product to a new one.
Inevitably I have neglected many important issues. I have discussed portfolio
choice but not household savings decisions, mortgage debt but not credit card debt
(Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Liu, and Souleles 2005, Bertaut and Haliassos 2006). I
have not tried to review the large literature on the fees charged by mutual funds,
banks, and other ﬁnancial intermediaries. I have not discussed evidence that some
households fail to exploit tax incentives for retirement saving (Amromin, Huang, and
Sialm 2005, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2005). I have emphasized ﬁnancial markets
that are relevant for middle-class households, but I have said nothing about payday
lending and other forms of credit that are used by poor households (Bolton and
Rosenthal 2005). I have likewise ignored issues that are important for extremely
wealthy households, such as estate tax management and the role of hedge funds. I
have treated households as unitary entities and have not considered the possibility
that bargaining between family members inﬂuences household decisions.
I have also sidestepped the issue of whether investment mistakes inﬂuence the
pattern of returns available in asset markets. This issue is important because it
may aﬀect the welfare cost of mistakes. For example, nonparticipation in equity
markets may increase the equity premium and worsen the welfare loss caused by this
mistake. There is an active debate about the magnitude of such eﬀects. On the one
hand, asset prices are ultimately determined by supply and demand; and household
investment mistakes are surely relevant for household asset demands. On the other
hand, asset prices are disproportionately inﬂuenced by the demands of wealthy, risk-
tolerant investors and professional arbitrageurs, so investment mistakes may be less
important in asset pricing than they are in household ﬁnance.
Even if asset prices are set eﬃciently, investment mistakes can have large welfare
costs for households. Since investment mistakes are particularly likely when new
ﬁnancial markets are created, or when households are asked to take on new ﬁnancial
planning responsibilities, they may greatly reduce the welfare gains that can be real-
ized from the current period of ﬁnancial innovation and from proposed new ﬁnancial
instruments (Shiller 2003). If household ﬁnance can achieve a good understanding of
the sources of investment mistakes, it may be possible for the ﬁeld to contribute ideas
40to limit the costs of these mistakes. For example, we can try to deﬁn et h ec o r ee l e -
ments of ﬁnancial literacy that make it possible for households to undertake ﬁnancial
planning (Bernheim 1998, Lusardi and Mitchell 2005). We can propose more infor-
mative disclosures and can help to structure the customized advice that is oﬀered by
ﬁnancial planning websites. We can suggest appropriate default investment options.
We can encourage public provision or tax subsidy of simple ﬁnancial products such
as well designed US savings bonds (Tufano and Schneider 2005). Work of this sort
extends the innovative spirit of ﬁnancial engineering to the retail marketplace.
The possibility that household ﬁnance may be able to improve welfare is an in-
spiring one. Keynes (1932) wrote that he looked forward to a distant future when
economists would be “thought of as humble, competent people, on a level with den-
tists.” Today, dentists spend much of their time delivering advice and easy-to-use
products that promote oral hygiene; economists for their part can deliver, or at least
design, advice and innovations that promote ﬁnancial hygiene.
41Appendix A: A Normative Model of Mortgage Choice
To clarify the issues that arise in mortgage ﬁnance, I consider a simpliﬁed example.
Campbell and Cocco (2003) present a richer model with a similar spirit and solve it
numerically.
I assume that at an initial date 0, a household buys a house and ﬁnances it with a
mortgage having face value M. For simplicity, I assume that the house is also worth
M, so the loan-value ratio is 100%. At date 1, the household pays interest on the
mortgage. At date 2, the household sells the house and repays the mortgage with
interest. The household also receives income and chooses non-housing consumption
at each date.
Mortgage contracts are speciﬁed in nominal terms, so the debt M is nominal. The
house, however, is a real asset whose nominal value grows with inﬂation. I assume
that inﬂation can take two values, low or high, and uncertainty about inﬂation is
resolved between dates 0 and 1. Thus inﬂation between date 0 and date 1 is either
(1+πL) or (1+πH), and cumulative inﬂation between dates 0 and 2 is either (1+πL)2
or (1+πH)2. This structure captures the historical tendency for inﬂation movements
to be highly persistent.
The household can choose between two standard mortgage contracts. A nomi-
nal ﬁxed-rate mortgage requires a nominal payment of RFM at date 1, and a ﬁnal
repayment of (1 + RF)M at date 2. The ﬁxed mortgage rate RF is set at date 0,
before inﬂation is observed. An adjustable-rate mortgage requires nominal payments
of RAHM at date 1 and (1+RAH)M at date 2 if inﬂation is high, and RALM at date
1a n d(1 + RAL)M at date 2 if inﬂation is low.
These mortgages do not correspond exactly to real-world mortgages, because they
repay principal in one lump sum at maturity (like Treasury bonds), rather than
amortizing the debt to produce level payments over the life of the mortgage. Level-
payment mortgages, however, repay principal slowly at ﬁrst and more rapidly later,
and the assumptions of the model capture this pattern within a simpliﬁed two-period
structure.
I assume that the riskless real interest rate is a constant r, and I ignore default
risk in mortgage lending. Thus the interest rate on an adjustable mortgage is
RAH =( 1+r)(1 + πH) − 1 ≈ r + πH
42if inﬂation is high, and
RAL =( 1+r)(1 + πL) − 1 ≈ r + πL
if inﬂation is low. The required real mortgage payment in period 1 is
RAi
1+πi
M =
µ
r +
πi
1+πi
¶
M
for i = H,L. The required real payment in period 2 is
(1 + RAi)
(1 + πi)2 M =( 1+r)
µ
1 −
πi
1+πi
¶
M
for i = H,L. The sum of all real payments, discounted back to date 0 at the real
interest rate r, does not depend on inﬂation and is always equal to M. In this sense
an adjustable-rate mortgage is a riskless liability, just as a ﬂoating-rate note is a
riskless investment.
Note however that the timing of required payments does depend on inﬂation. An
increase in inﬂation raises the nominal interest rate and accelerates the repayment of
t h em o r t g a g ed e b t . E a c hp e r c e n t a g ep o i n ti n c r e a s ei ni n ﬂa t i o nr e q u i r e sa ni n c r e a s e d
mortgage payment of about 1% of the face value of the mortgage. This is compen-
sated by a reduced real payment when the mortgage matures. In other words, an
adjustable-rate mortgage is a shorter-duration liability when inﬂation is high.
A ﬁxed-rate mortgage has a very diﬀerent sensitivity to inﬂation. The interest
rate on a ﬁxed-rate mortgage is RF, regardless of whether inﬂation is high or low.
T h er e q u i r e dr e a lm o r t g a g ep a y m e n ti np e r i o d1i s
RF
1+πi
M
for i = H,L, and the required real payment in period 2 is
(1 + RF)
(1 + πi)2M.
The sum of all real payments, discounted back to date 0 at the real interest rate r,i s
declining in inﬂation; thus a ﬁxed-rate mortgage beneﬁts the borrower when inﬂation
is high.
43What is the optimal mortgage contract in this model? I will assume that the
household has real income Y each period. If the household can borrow or lend freely
at the riskless real interest rate, then the household does not care about the timing
of mortgage payments and is concerned only with the expected level and variability
of lifetime resources. The adjustable-rate mortgage gives the household lifetime
resources, discounted to time 0, of
"
1
1+r
+
µ
1
1+r
¶2#
(Y − rM),
allowing the household to consume a riskless (Y − rM) each period.
If mortgage rates are set by lenders who are risk-neutral with respect to inﬂation
risk, then the ﬁxed mortgage rate will be set to equate the expected present values
of ﬁxed and adjustable mortgage payments.33 In other words, the expected value of
household lifetime resources will be the same under ﬁxed and adjustable mortgages.
However lifetime resources are random under a ﬁxed-rate mortgage, so a risk-averse
household will always prefer an adjustable-rate mortgage. This conclusion is only
strengthened if mortgage lenders are averse to inﬂation risk and charge a premium
rate for bearing it.
How then can we understand the observed predominance of long-term nominal
ﬁxed-rate mortgages in the US mortgage market? First, it is important to consider
that many households are borrowing-constrained, particularly in the early years of
homeownership. Borrowing-constrained households care not just about lifetime re-
sources, but about the resources available in each period. A borrowing-constrained
household with an adjustable-rate mortgage will have real consumption in period 1
33Note that this does not mean the ﬁxed mortgage interest rate will equal the gross expected
inﬂation rate times the gross real interest rate. The present value formula is convex in inﬂation, so
ﬁxed-rate lenders gain more from low inﬂa t i o nt h a nt h e yl o s ef r o mh i g hi n ﬂation. This convexity
eﬀect lowers the equilibrium ﬁxed mortgage rate. The ﬁxed mortgage rate satisﬁes the equation
1
1+r
E
∙
1
1+π
¸
RF +
µ
1
1+r
¶2
E
"µ
1
1+π
¶2#
(1 + RF)=1 .
The solution to this equation is lower than the rate R∗
F that would equate expected ﬁrst-period
mortgage payments with those of an adjustable-rate mortgage, which in turn is lower than the gross
real interest rate times the expected gross inﬂation rate.
44of
CA1i = Y −
µ
r +
πi
1+πi
¶
M
and real consumption in period 2 of
CA2i = Y −
µ
r −
πi
1+πi
(1 + r)
¶
M.
A borrowing-constrained household with a ﬁxed-rate mortgage will have real con-
sumption in period 1 of
CF1i = Y −
RF
1+πi
M
and real consumption in period 2 of
CA2i = Y + M
µ
1 −
1+RF
(1 + πi)2
¶
.
This consumption proﬁle has less variability in period 1, because inﬂation shocks
aﬀect period-1 consumption only in proportion to the product of the nominal interest
rate and the face value of the mortgage, and not in proportion to the whole face value
of the mortgage. A Taylor expansion around the average inﬂation rate, π,s h o w s
that for small inﬂation volatility, the standard deviation of period-1 consumption
is Mσπ/(1 + π)2 for the adjustable-rate mortgage, and only RF t i m e sa sl a r g ef o r
the ﬁxed-rate mortgage. On the other hand, the ﬁxed-rate consumption proﬁle
has greater variability in period 2, because inﬂation shocks aﬀect the whole value
of the mortgage and are not compensated by interest rate variations. A similar
Taylor expansion shows that for small inﬂation volatility, the standard deviation of
period-2 consumption is (1 + r)Mσπ/(1 + π)2 for the adjustable-rate mortgage, and
2(1 + RF)/(1 + r)(1 + π) times as large for the ﬁxed-rate mortgage.
What about the average levels of real consumption in period 1 and period 2? If
inﬂation is deterministic, then ﬁxed- and adjustable-rate mortgages deliver the same
time path of payments and thus the same average levels of consumption in the two
periods. If inﬂation is random, the convexity of ﬁxed-rate mortgages lowers the ﬁxed
mortgage rate below the level that would equate expected real payments in period 1
with those required by an adjustable-rate mortgage. Fixed-rate mortgages are thus
back-loaded relative to adjustable-rate mortgages.
A borrowing-constrained household will ﬁnd the back-loading of a ﬁxed-rate mort-
gage attractive, as a way to increase expected period-1 consumption relative to
45period-2 consumption. If the household is risk-averse, it will in addition ﬁnd the
reduced volatility of period-1 consumption attractive. For both reasons, a borrowing-
constrained household with a suﬃciently high time discount rate will prefer a ﬁxed-
rate mortgage.
Reﬁnancing
So far I have ignored an important feature of ﬁxed-rate mortgages, that they give
the household an option to reﬁnance. This option aﬀects both the interest rate and
the risk characteristics of a ﬁxed-rate mortgage. To model reﬁnancing, suppose that
the ﬁx e d - r a t em o r t g a g ec a nb er e p a i dw i t h o u tp e n a l t yi np e r i o d1 ,a f t e rt h ep e r i o d - 1
ﬁxed interest payment has been made. The household will ﬁnd it worthwhile to
reﬁnance, and take out a new mortgage in period 1, if inﬂation turns out to be low
so that nominal rates are lower in period 1 than they were in period 0. Thus a
reﬁnanceable ﬁxed-rate mortgage makes ﬁxed payments if inﬂation is high, but if the
mortgage is reﬁnanced because inﬂation is low, it makes payments of
RF
1+πL
M
in period 1, and
(1 + r)
(1 + πL)
M
in period 2. The household now avoids making high period-1 interest payments
when inﬂation turns out to be high, and has partial protection against a high real
debt burden when inﬂation turns out to be low. (The reﬁnancing option protects
against one period of low inﬂation but not two, since a period elapses between initial
ﬁnancing and reﬁnancing.)
Of course, the option to reﬁn a n c ed o e sn o tc o m ef o rf r e e . T h er a t eo nar e ﬁnance-
able ﬁxed-rate mortgage must be higher than on a ﬁxed-rate mortgage that prohibits
reﬁnancing. A reﬁnanceable ﬁxed-rate mortgage must also require higher period-1
payments than does an adjustable-rate mortgage. If lenders are risk-neutral, then
the expected present value of real lifetime payments is the same for all mortgages. A
reﬁnanceable FRM has lower expected real payments in period 2 than does an ARM;
therefore the reﬁnanceable FRM must have higher expected payments in period 1.
This means that a borrowing-constrained household that is risk-neutral will prefer an
46ARM, because such a household wishes to increase average period-1 consumption rel-
ative to period-2 consumption, and does not care about the randomness of mortgage
payments.34
A risk-averse constrained household, however, may prefer a reﬁnanceable FRM
because the reduction in ﬁrst-period consumption risk may outweigh both the increase
in second-period consumption risk and the reduction in the average level of ﬁrst-period
consumption. This is a striking reversal of the analysis for unconstrained households,
which ﬁnd ARMs to be safer than FRMs. The lesson is that perceptions of risk can
be profoundly aﬀected by the presence of borrowing constraints.
The nature of risk aversion in this model deserves some discussion. If the house-
hold has a utility function deﬁned over consumption in each period, then under stan-
dard assumptions about the utility function, the derived risk aversion with respect to
mortgage payment risk is increasing in the level of consumption risk aversion. It is
also increasing with respect to randomness in real income that is uncorrelated with in-
ﬂation. Such randomness creates a “background risk” that makes the consumer more
averse to mortgage risk. Finally, the randomness of mortgage payments is relatively
more important the larger the mortgage relative to the household’s income. Thus the
model implies that a household should be more likely to prefer a reﬁnanceable FRM
if it is naturally conservative, has a volatile income, or has a large mortgage relative
to its income. Campbell and Cocco (2003) obtain these results in their multi-period
numerical model.
It is possible to enrich this model further to allow for reﬁnancing that is driven
by decisions to move house rather than by movements in interest rates. Households
that move must reﬁnance their mortgages even if interest rates are high rather than
low. Reﬁnancing of this sort reduces the period-2 beneﬁts of reﬁnanceable FRMs to
borrowers, and lowers the equilibrium interest rate on these mortgages. For a given
moving probability in the population as a whole, and thus a given reﬁnanceable FRM
rate, a household that is more likely to move gets a lower beneﬁt from a reﬁnanceable
FRM and is more likely to prefer an ARM.
F i n a l l y ,o n ec a na l l o wf o rt h ef a c tt h a tm a n yh o u s e h o l d sd on o tr e ﬁnance their
mortgages, even when it is optimal to do so. A household that fails to reﬁnance a
34This result is consistent with statements in some personal ﬁnance guides. Orman (1999), for
example, writes that “ARMs are best utilized... when your cash ﬂow is currently tight but you
expect it to increase as time goes on” (p.254), while Irwin (1996) writes “Sometimes ARMs have
lower initial loan costs. If cash is a big consideration for you, look into them.” (p.144).
47FRM when the interest rate falls pays additional mortgage interest, so the presence of
such households in the population reduces the equilibrium mortgage rate. Given the
aggregate prepayment rate, and thus the reﬁnanceable FRM rate, a household that
believes itself to be more likely than average to reﬁnance optimally will get a higher
beneﬁt from a reﬁn a n c e a b l eF R Ma n di sm o r el i k e l yt op r e f e rt h i st y p eo fm o r t g a g e .
Appendix B: Household-Level Mortgage Data
The household-level mortgage data studied in this paper and in Schwartz (2006)
come from two data sources: the American Housing Survey (AHS), conducted by the
US Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Residential Finance
Survey (RFS), conducted by the Census Bureau. Both surveys provide basic infor-
mation on housing units, their residents, and their mortgages. However they have
diﬀerent strengths and weaknesses.
The AHS is conducted in every odd year. Interviewers have returned to the same
housing units since 1985, adding new units to reﬂect new housing development; thus
the AHS is a panel dataset with a long time dimension. The AHS follows housing
units rather than households, but asks detailed questions about the residents of each
housing unit, including demographic and educational information. Interviewers also
ask whether residents own their housing unit, whether they have a mortgage, what
is the form of the mortgage, and what rate is being paid on the mortgage.
The main weaknesses of the AHS have to do with data quality. Participation
in the survey is voluntary, and many residents either refuse to participate or give
only partial answers to survey questions. Even a simple question such as whether a
housing unit’s residents lived in the unit at the time of the previous survey is answered
unreliably. To establish whether a household is the same as the one that responded
to the previous survey, one can combine the answer to this question with demographic
data.
Mortgage data are even more problematic. A detailed review of the AHS by Lam
and Kaul (2003) shows that as mortgages age, households’ reports of the original
principal value, monthly payments, and mortgage rates can change from one survey
to the next. Schwartz (2006) handles this problem by following households through
time, assuming at each point in time that their mortgage was originated at the most
recent date they have ever previously reported as a mortgage origination date, and
assuming that the terms of the mortgage are those they reported in the most recent
48survey following the origination date. The motivation for this procedure is that
households are more likely to report the terms of their mortgage accurately if they
recently took out the mortgage. Mortgage rates derived in this manner track the
historical rates reported by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC)
much more accurately than the raw reported rates. However there are still some
implausibly low rates, and I replace any rate that is more than two percentage points
below the average FHLMC rate prevailing during the mortgage origination period
with the average FHLMC rate less two percent. The results are robust to reasonable
variations in this truncation procedure, for example replacing self-reported mortgage
rates with FHLMC rates.
The RFS has been conducted every ten years since 1951 as part of the decennial
census. Each survey draws a diﬀerent subsample from the census population, so
the RFS is a series of cross-sections and not a panel. The RFS asks homeowners to
identify their mortgage lenders and then cross-checks mortgage data with the lenders,
resulting in much greater accuracy of mortgage terms. The main weakness of the RFS
is that it contains relatively little information on homeowners; in particular, it lacks
the educational information contained in the AHS. I use the RFS as a cross-check on
the mortgage rates reported in the AHS. In particular, I ﬁnd that the distribution
of mortgage spreads in the 2001 RFS closely matches the distribution extracted from
the 2001 AHS and reported in Figure 5.
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age squared
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Standard errors are underneath the coefficients. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, 5% by **, and 1% by ***
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0.136 0.045 0.031 0.079 0.054
ln(mortgage) squared 0.003 0.002 -0.003 * -0.027 *** -0.038 ***
0.007 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003
N
Standard errors are underneath the coefficients. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, 5% by **, and 1% by ***
All regressions contain year and region fixed effects, and also control for gender, marriage status, whether the house is located in an urban area
1 In the reference household, the household head is a married white male with no high school diploma
2 Change in percentage points from the reference person by changing variables from 0 to 1 if binary and by 1 standard  deviation if continuous
Whether a household 
moved between 2001 
and 2003
Whether a household refinanced 
a 30 year fixed mortgage 
between 2001 & 2003
Whether a household 
reported a rate 2 or more % 
points below FHLMC in 2001
ln(house value) 
squared
Mortgage rate for 
30 year fixed 
mortgages in 2001
Mortgage rate for 
30 year fixed 
mortgages in 2003
7610 9749
Coefficients Coefficients
5190 5735 7610
Table II: Mortgage Refinancing and Mortgage Rates
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